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At present, the fight against tax evasion, currently often referred to as base ero-
sion and profit shifting (BEPS), has become an important issue not only at the 
level of the OECD as well as the EU but also for governments around the globe. 
In this context, hybrid arrangements and existing preferential tax regimes have 
been identified, inter alia, as key factors for BEPS outcomes. Against this back-
ground, the purpose of this article is to critically assess the impact of the 
measures presented under BEPS Actions 2 and 5 on the existing mismatches 
thereby focusing on the question whether these proposals are likely to achieve the 
intended international coherence in corporate income taxation.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Existing Disparities between Tax Systems as the Root Cause for Mismatches 
Tax policy may be considered one of the core aspects of countries’ sovereignty. Given the 
different aspects that have to be taken into account in this context, countries face different 
challenges when designing their domestic tax systems. Therefore, bearing in mind that each 
country has the right to design its tax system in the way it regards most appropriate, the tax 
systems around the globe differ significantly. In fact, given the numerous disparities of the 
domestic tax systems throughout the world, mismatches between national income tax legisla-
tion are more the rule than the exception.
1
 Due to the lack of harmonization with regard to the 
various tax systems, taxpayers face the opportunity to reduce their overall tax burden by dili-
gently structuring their foreign business relations. As a consequence, cross-border payments 
may give rise to a deduction in the source state while not being included in the taxable income 
of the recipient. 
 
In practice, such results are very often achieved by use of hybrid mismatch arrangements. 
Even though the manifestations of hybrid mismatch arrangements differ significantly, the 
major point all these structures have in common is that they exploit differences in the tax 
treatment of an entity or instrument under the laws of two or more tax jurisdictions to achieve 
double non-taxation, including long-term deferral.
2
 In this context, double non-taxation struc-
tures causing great concern are arrangements that make use of hybrid financial instruments. 
While financial instruments are traditionally divided into equity and debt, a wide variety of 
instruments incorporate elements of both equity and debt and are, thus, referred to as hybrid 
financial instruments.
3
 Assuming that these hybrid instruments are treated differently for tax 
purposes in the respective states of residence of the payer and the payee, most notably as debt 
in the state of residence of the payer and as equity in the state of residence of the payee, such 
arrangements lead to double non-taxation.
4
 This is because, due to the mutually incompatible 
positions regarding the qualification of the financial instrument, the payments based thereon 
are deductible as interest expenses at the level of the payer while there is no corresponding 
                                                
1
 See also Cooper, Some thoughts on the OECD’s Recommendations on Hybrid Mismatches, BIT 2015 Vol-
ume 69) Nr 6/7 (Chapter 1). 
2
 Compare Dziurdź, “Circularly Linked” Rules Countering Deduction and Non-Inclusion Schemes: Some Thoughts 
on a Tie-Breaker Test, BIT 2013, 306 (at 306). 
3
 See, for example, J.A. Duncan, General Report, in Tax Treatment of Hybrid Financial Instruments in Cross-
Border Transactions, International Fiscal Association (IFA) Cahiers de droit fiscal international vol. 85a, sec. 3.1. 
(Kluwer 2000), Online Books IBFD; M. Helminen, The Dividend Concept in International Tax Law pp. 251 et seq. 
(Kluwer 1999) and Classification of Cross-Border Payments on Hybrid Instruments, BIT 2004, at 56 et seq., Jour-
nals IBFD. 
4
 However, at the same time it is important to note that such mismatches may also result in a double taxation.  
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inclusion in taxable income at the level of the payee (Deduction/Non-Inclusion, D/NI).
5
 At 
the same time, similar results may be achieved by use of hybrid entities. Due to the deviating 
qualification of the hybrid entity in the states concerned, a payment may give rise to a deduc-
tion while it is not taken into consideration when determining the tax base of the recipient. 
Since hybrid mismatch arrangements may significantly reduce the overall tax burden for tax-
payers, they play an important role in the context of tax planning, thereby opening up a varie-
ty of legal possibilities to minimize the tax base.
6
 For example, a deductible payment can give 
rise to a D/NI outcome where the payment is made by a hybrid entity that is disregarded un-
der the laws of the payee jurisdiction. Furthermore, also deductible payments to a hybrid enti-
ty may give rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes, i.e. when that payment is not included in or-
dinary income in the jurisdiction where the payee is established (the establishment jurisdic-
tion) or in the jurisdiction of any investor in that hybrid entity (the investor jurisdiction). 
Against this background, both the OECD and the European Commission have launched initia-
tives to counter BEPS resulting from aggressive tax planning, thereby focusing, inter alia, on 
the use of hybrid arrangements. 
 
However, while the international focus is mainly on hybrid mismatches exploiting the differ-
ences in the tax treatment of an entity or instrument under the laws of two or more tax juris-
dictions to achieve double non-taxation, it has to be noted that divergent tax outcomes do not 
necessarily require the use of hybrid financial instruments or entities. Given the disparities 
with regard to the taxation of foreign income, e.g. the source-based versus residence-based 
approach, such mismatches may also occur as a result of the interplay of these different con-
cepts. This applies, for example, where the source state grants a deduction of a cross-border 
interest payment while the residence state of the recipient follows a source-based approach 
according to which foreign sourced income is, in general, exempt from tax. Furthermore, 
mismatches may also be the result of the interaction of generally accepted principles, e.g. the 
deductibility of certain expenses such as interest and royalty payments on the one hand, and 
preferential tax regimes in the residence state of the recipient on the other hand.  
                                                
5
 Compare Lüdicke, “Tax Arbitrage” with Hybrid Entities: Challenges and Responses, BIT 2014, 309 (at 309 et 
seq.). 
6
 See for an overview of the numerous hybrid arrangements including hybrid financial instruments as well as 
hybrid instruments, for example, Rosembuj, Intertax 2011, 158 (at 159 f); Rosembuj, Abusive Transactions on 
Financial Hybrids, Intertax 2011, 234 (at 234 ff); Kofler/Kofler in Brähler/Lösel, FS Djanani (2008) 381 (at 382 ff); 
Herzig, Thema I: Hybride Finanzinstrumente im nationalen und internationalen Steuerrecht, IStR 2000, 482 (at 
482 ff); Kaltenberg, Hybride Finanzierungsinstrumente als Steuerplanungsinstrument – Analyse der steuerlichen 
Vorteilhaftigkeit am Beispiel von Outbound-Finanzierungsbeziehungen zwischen Deutschland und Luxemburg, 
IStR 2012, 837 (at 837 ff); Bünning, Germany: Use of Partnership and Other Hybrid Instruments in Cross-Border 
Transactions, Intertax 2003, 401 (at 401 ff); Joseph, BEPS, Hybrid Entities and Financing, Derivatives & Financial 
Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 4 (Chapter 1.); Bendlinger, Hybride Gestaltungen im internationalen Steuer-
recht: der Statusbericht der OECD aus österreichischer Sicht, SWI 2012, 485 (at 485). 
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In fact, tax competition and the interaction of tax systems can have effects that some countries 
may view as negative or harmful but others may not. For example, one country may consider 
investment incentives a policy instrument to stimulate new investment, while another may 
view such tax incentives as diverting real investment from one country to another. For exam-
ple, countries with specific structural disadvantages, such as poor geographical location or the 
lack of natural or personal resources, frequently consider that special tax incentives or tax 
regimes are necessary to offset non-tax disadvantages, including any additional cost from 
locating in such areas. This applies, inter alia, for Singapore, providing for several tax incen-
tives in order to motivate MNCs to establish their headquarters within its territory. Even 
though the possible mismatches resulting therefrom, i.e. D/NI-outcomes, are identical to the 
one generated by means of hybrid arrangements, these mismatches may arise in situations 
where there has been no attempt at tax avoidance. Rather, the reason for these albeit unin-
tended results is simply the lack of harmonization of the different national tax systems and the 
diverging policy choices made by sovereign legislators. While the issue of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements is thoroughly dealt with in the course of BEPS Action 2, the impact of preferen-
tial domestic tax regimes on the evasion of the tax base is addressed by BEPS Action 5. Un-
der the heading “Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account trans-
parency and substance”, BEPS Action 5 stresses, inter alia, the need for “a holistic approach 
to evaluate preferential tax regimes in the BEPS context”.
7
  
 
As the OECD emphasised already in its BEPS Action Plan in 2013, “there is a need to com-
plement rules to prevent double taxation with a fundamentally new set of standards designed 
to establish international coherence in corporate income taxation.”
8
 However, in view of the 
various policy choices by sovereign tax legislators, it is questionable whether the measures 
proposed by the OECD are, in fact, likely to lead to the intended international coherence in 
corporate income taxation. 
1.2 Aim and Structure of the Paper 
Against this background, the purpose of this article is to critically assess the impact of the 
measures presented under BEPS Actions 2 and 5 on the existing mismatches, thereby focus-
ing on the question whether these proposals are likely to achieve the intended international 
coherence in corporate income taxation. Therefore, first, the work of the OECD with regard to 
the neutralization of hybrid mismatches will be analysed. Since hybrid arrangements have 
                                                
7
 See OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, (OECD Publishing), p. 18. 
8
 See OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, p. 15. 
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been identified as tax planning instruments in order to generate D/NI-outcomes, the authors 
will give an overview of the previous and current work of the OECD in this respect specifical-
ly focusing on the linking rules presented in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2. In this con-
text, special attention will be given to the underlying aim of the approach taken by the OECD. 
Based thereon, the authors will elaborate on the implementation of the recommendations into 
domestic law in the light of the existing mismatches. In this context, possible advantages, as 
well as disadvantages associated with the implementation of the recommended linking rules 
for the state concerned, shall be identified. Similarly, the linking rules will be assessed from a 
taxpayer’s perspective.  
 
Following up on this, the paper will focus on the work of the OECD on BEPS Action 5. Bear-
ing in mind the possible mismatches in tax outcomes caused by preferential tax regimes pro-
vided for only in certain countries, the author will concentrate on the final results of the work 
of the OECD in this with regard. By doing so, the aim of the respective section 3 is to illus-
trate the borderline drawn by the OECD between justified preferential tax regimes and harm-
ful tax practices.  
 
Finally, the main findings of the research project will be summarized, thereby providing for 
some conclusions on the abovementioned issues. 
 
Following this structure, the main purpose of the paper is to deal with the underlying question 
as to whether the measures developed by the OECD are likely to enhance international coher-
ence in corporate income taxation. In this context, given the different approaches with regard 
to the BEPS project that may be identified in Asia-Pacific, the paper will focus on the impli-
cations of BEPS Actions 2 and 5 in this region. As a consequence, regarding the implementa-
tion of BEPS Action 2 in Asia-Pacific, special emphasis will be given to the respective legis-
lative actions in Australia. At the same time, in view of the tax incentives provided for in the 
Singaporean Income Tax Act, Singapore as a non-member state of the OECD will be taken as 
a test object in order to assess the impact of BEPS Action 5 on existing preferential tax re-
gimes.  
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2 BEPS ACTION 2: NEUTRALISE THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH AR-
RANGEMENTS 
2.1 Hybrid Mismatches in the Light of the BEPS Project 
2.1.1 Background and Previous Work with Regard to Hybrid Mismatches 
Hybrid mismatch arrangements may be considered a well-known phenomenon in internation-
al tax law.
9
 In fact, this issue is not new but has been already dealt with in the course of sever-
al initiatives within the EU
10
 and particularly within the OECD.
11
 Already in its Report Hy-
brid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues, published in 2012 (Hybrids 
Report 2012), the OECD discussed the implementation of rules specifically addressing hybrid 
mismatch arrangements. In this context, the OECD concluded that “[d]omestic law rules 
which link the tax treatment of an entity, instrument or transfer in the country concerned to 
the tax treatment in another country appear to hold significant potential as a tool to address 
hybrid mismatch arrangements that are viewed as inappropriate”.
12
 Based thereon, the report 
contained a summary of examples of rules that have been introduced throughout the partici-
pating countries to address unintended tax outcomes, such as multiple deductions, deduc-
tion/no inclusion, or foreign tax credit generators.
13
 However, these specific recommendations 
made by the OECD were only partially followed by policy action. 
2.1.2 Final Report on BEPS Action 2 – Linking Rules to Neutralise Hybrid 
Mismatches 
Against this background, hybrid mismatch arrangements have also been identified as one of 
the key issues in the course of the BEPS project of the OECD. In this context, BEPS Action 2, 
inter alia, calls for the development of “recommendations regarding the design of domestic 
rules to neutralise the effects of hybrid instruments and entities.”
14
 According to BEPS-
Action 2, this may include:
15
 
i. […]  
                                                
9
 See Bundgaard, Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage using Inbound Hybrid Financial Instruments Curbed in Denmark by 
Unilateral Reclassification of Debt into Equity, BIT 2008, 33 (33). 
10
 For an overview of the different working papers on the level of the European Union compare de Boer/Marres, 
BEPS Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects on Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 15). 
11
 See OECD (2011), Addressing Tax Risks Involving Bank Losses (2010); OECD, Corporate Loss Utilisation 
through Aggressive Tax Planning, (OECD Publishing); OECD (2012), Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy 
and Compliance Issues, (OECD Publishing). 
12
 See OECD (2012), Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (OECD Publishing), 
p. 14, para. 35. 
13
 See OECD (2012), Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (OECD Publishing), 
pp. 15 et seq. 
14
 See, OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD Publishing), p. 15. 
15
 See, OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, pp. 15 et seq.; compare for an overview 
also Dourado, Aggressive Tax Planning in the EU Law in the Light of BEPS: The EC Recommendations on Ag-
gressive Tax Planning and BEPS Actions 2 and 6, Intertax 2015, 42 (at 51). 
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ii. domestic law provisions that prevent exemption or non-recognition for payments that 
are deductible by the payor; 
iii. domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a payment that is not includible in 
income by the recipient (and is not subject to taxation under controlled foreign com-
pany (CFC) or similar rules); 
iv. domestic law provisions that deny a deduction for a payment that is also deductible in 
another jurisdiction; and 
v. where necessary, guidance on co‑ordination or tie-breaker rules if more than one 
country seeks to apply such rules to a transaction or structure. 
In the light of these outlines provided for in the BEPS Action Plan, and given its practical 
relevance, the fight against hybrid mismatch arrangements can be considered an essential part 
of the BEPS project. After having completed the work thereon,
16
 the OECD presented its re-
sults in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 published in October 2015.
17
 Part I of the Final 
Report provides recommendations for domestic rules to neutralize the effect of hybrid mis-
matches where they arise in respect of payments made under a hybrid financial instrument or 
payments made to or by a hybrid entity. On the one hand, the OECD proposes specific chang-
es to the domestic laws of the countries affected by a cross-border hybrid arrangement. Ac-
cording to the considerations of the OECD, these amendments are aimed at ensuring a better 
alignment between domestic and cross-border tax outcomes.
18
 The Report recommends that 
participating jurisdictions adopt domestic rules targeting two types of payments. Accordingly, 
the Report is not only concerned with payments under a hybrid mismatch arrangement that 
result in deduction/non-inclusion outcomes (Deduction/Non-Inclusion, D/NI), but also deals 
with payments that give rise to double deduction outcomes (Double Deduction, DD).
19
  
 
Furthermore, the Final Report on BEPS-Action 2 proposes the implementation of hybrid 
mismatch rules that adjust the tax outcomes in one jurisdiction to align them with the tax con-
sequences in another. The thrust of all these hybrid mismatch rules is to link the domestic tax 
treatment of an entity, instrument or transfer involving a foreign country with the tax treat-
ment in that foreign country. As a consequence, mismatches due to the lack of coordination of 
                                                
16
 See OECD (2014), Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Ar-
rangements (Recommendations for Domestic Laws), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD 
Publishing); OECD (2014), Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 2: Neutralise the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements (Treaty Issues), OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publishing); OECD 
(2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2: 2014 Deliverable, OECD/G20 Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publishing). 
17
 See OECD (2015), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, 
OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publishing). 
18
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 16, para. 4. 
19
 See Carman, Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 2.1.). 
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the tax laws in the counties involved shall be eliminated.
20
 While these rules are targeted at 
aligning the tax treatment of an instrument or entity with the tax treatment in the counterparty 
jurisdiction, they shall not disturb the other tax, commercial or regulatory consequences relat-
ed thereto.
21
 According to the understanding of the OECD, the rules shall apply automatically. 
In addition, the Report encourages every jurisdiction to introduce all the recommended rules 
so that the effect of hybrid mismatch arrangement is neutralised even if the counterparty ju-
risdiction does not have effective hybrid mismatch rules. However, such a comprehensive 
implementation of the proposed linking rules may, at the same time, lead to an increased risk 
of double taxation. To counter this potential undesirable effect, the Final Report on 
BEPS Action 2 recommends the suggested rules to be organized in a strict hierarchy. As a 
consequence of the rule order proposed by the OECD, only one jurisdiction shall apply rules 
sufficient to neutralise the mismatch and, since this rule order prevents more than one country 
applying the rule to the same arrangement, double taxation shall be avoided.
22
 
 
The primary rule recommended in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 is to deny the taxpay-
er’s deduction for a payment to the extent that it is not included in the taxable income of the 
recipient in the counterparty jurisdiction. Similarly, the deduction shall be denied for pay-
ments that give rise to two deductions in respect of the same payment. In the event the prima-
ry rule is not applied in the payer jurisdiction, the counterparty jurisdiction can generally ap-
ply a defensive rule requiring the deductible payment to be included in income or denying the 
duplicate deduction depending on the nature of the mismatch.  
2.2 The Linking Rules of the OECD with Regard to D/NI-Schemes 
2.2.1 Introductory Remarks 
As it regards the neutralization of hybrid mismatches that result in a D/NI-outcome, the 
OECD proposes two different approaches. On the one hand, the countries are encouraged to 
adopt their existing legislation to ensure that their application to cross-border transactions 
leads to the tax outcomes that are originally intended in a purely domestic situation (so-called 
“Specific Recommendations”). In this respect, the paper will deal with Recommendation 2 
and Recommendation 5 thereby focusing on their relevance with regard to the avoidance of 
D/NI-outcomes. On the other hand, the OECD proposes for the implementation of a series of 
rules specifically targeted at linking the domestic tax treatment of an entity, instrument or 
                                                
20
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 16, para. 6. 
21
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 16, para. 4. 
22
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 18, para. 15. 
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transfer involving a foreign country with the tax treatment in that foreign country in order to 
neutralise the unintended D/NI-outcomes (so-called “Hybrid Mismatch Rules”). Given their 
practical relevance in the light of the existing hybrid mismatch arrangements leading to D/NI-
results, the paper will focus on the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule (Recommendation 1), 
the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule (Recommendation 3) and the Reverse Hybrid Rule 
(Recommendation 4). 
2.2.2 Recommendation 1 – Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule 
2.2.2.1 Starting Point: D/NI-Outcome 
First, the OECD deals with the D/NI-outcomes generated by the use of a hybrid financial in-
strument. Given the wide variety of financial instruments and the different ways they can be 
characterised and treated for tax purposes, the OECD considers it impossible to comprehen-
sively and accurately identify all the situations where a payment under the instrument can 
give rise to a hybrid mismatch. Therefore, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule proposed as 
Recommendation 1 focuses on whether the payment is expected to give rise to a mismatch in 
tax outcomes and whether that mismatch is attributable to differences in the way the instru-
ment is taxed under the laws of the payer and payee jurisdictions. The following analysis shall 
be carried out on the basis of the following simplified illustration of a mismatch arrangement 
involving the use of a hybrid financial instrument:
23
 
 
In this example B Co, resident in State B issues a hybrid financial instrument to A Co, resi-
dent in State A. Since the instrument is treated as debt for the purposes of State B law, B Co is 
entitled to a deduction for interest payments made under the instrument. At the same time, the 
payment is not subjected to taxation in State A. This mismatch can be due to a number of rea-
                                                
23
 The following graphics is based on the work of the OECD (see OECD (2014), Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid 
Mismatch Arrangements, Action 2: 2014 Deliverable, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD 
Publishing), p. 33, para. 52). See also Carman, Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 
(Chapter 3.1.). 
Lukas Mechtler/Cindy Wong  Mismatches in Tax Outcomes 
Page | 11  
sons. Most commonly the financial instrument is treated by the issuer as debt and by the hold-
er as equity. This difference in characterisation often results in a payment of deductible inter-
est by the issuer being treated as a dividend which is exempted from the charge to tax in the 
holder’s jurisdiction or subject to some other form of equivalent tax relief (an exemption, ex-
clusion, indirect tax credit, etc.).  
 
However, the non-taxation at the level of the recipient does not necessarily require a qualifi-
cation conflict with regard to the underlying financial instrument. Rather, such a mismatch 
may also arise as a result of the attribution of the payment to a foreign PE of the recipient. If 
the tax treaty between the residence state of the recipient and the PE state provides for the 
exemption method, then the payer is entitled to claim a deduction while there is no corre-
sponding taxation in the residence state of the recipient. This also applies when the domestic 
law of the residence state of the recipient provides for a personal tax exemption for the recipi-
ent. 
2.2.2.2 Underlying Principle and Legal consequences 
Against this background, the OECD proposes for the implementation of a linking rule in order 
to eliminate the mismatch in tax outcomes.
24
 The underlying principle of the Hybrid Finan-
cial Instrument Rule is to link the tax treatment of payments under a financial instrument so 
that a taxpayer cannot claim a deduction for a financing expense unless that payment is re-
quired to be included in ordinary income at the level of the recipient. Therefore, the amount of 
deductions allowed under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, or the amount of income to be 
included in the payee jurisdiction shall be adjusted. By doing so, the Hybrid Financial In-
strument Rule aims at ensuring that the aggregate tax treatment of the arrangement is the same 
regardless of the form of the instrument used or whether the adjustment is made in the payee 
or payer jurisdictions.
25
 However, although the effect of the primary rule is to deny the payer 
a deduction, in order to bring the tax treatment of the payment in line with the tax treatment in 
the payee jurisdiction, no changes should be made to the character of the instrument or the 
payment made under the instrument for tax purposes.
26
 At the same time, the OECD points 
out that the adjustment should be no more than is necessary to neutralise the instrument’s hy-
                                                
24
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 25, para. 18. 
25
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 32, para. 49. 
26
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 32, para. 50; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final 
Report, pp. 175 et seq., Example 1.1. 
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brid effect. Thus, the aim of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule is to ensure a single taxa-
tion of the respective payment while avoiding an unintended double taxation.
27
  
 
In order to tackle the identified D/NI-outcomes, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule follows 
a two-steps approach: According to the primary rule, the payer jurisdiction shall deny a de-
duction to the extent the payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome.
28
 As a consequence of this 
primary response, the payer is not entitled to claim a deduction for the payment unless it is 
treated as ordinary income of the payee. In case the payer jurisdiction does not implement or 
apply the recommended provision denying the deduction, then the defensive rule calls on the 
payee jurisdiction to treat the deductible payment as ordinary income under a financial in-
strument.
29
 By doing so, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule is, on the one hand, aimed at 
ensuring a single taxation of the respective payment in either the source state or the residence 
state of the recipient. On the other hand, the policy behind the Hybrid Financial Instrument 
Rule is, in general, to prevent a taxpayer from entering into structured arrangements or ar-
rangements with a related party in order to exploit differences in the tax treatment of a finan-
cial instrument to produce a D/NI outcome.
30
  
2.2.2.3 Conditions for the application 
2.2.2.3.1 Payment 
First, the application of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule requires a payment. According 
to the definition provided for in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2,
31
 a payment is any trans-
fer of value and includes an amount that is capable of being paid such as a future or contin-
gent obligation to make a payment.
32
 In this context, the definition of payment includes the 
accrual of a future payment obligation even when that accrued amount does not correspond to 
any increase in the payment obligation during that period. Given the required transfer of val-
ue, the definition specifically excludes, however, payments that are only deemed to be made 
for tax purposes and that do not involve the creation of any new economic rights between the 
                                                
27
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 32, para. 49. 
28
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 23, Recommendation 1.1.(a): “The payer jurisdiction will 
deny a deduction for such payment to the extent it gives rise to a D/NI outcome.” 
29
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 23, Recommendation 1.1.(b): “If the payer jurisdiction does 
not neutralise the mismatch then the payee jurisdiction will require such payment to be included in ordinary in-
come to the extent the payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome.” 
30
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 25, para. 18. 
31
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 123, Recommendation 12: “Payment includes any amount 
capable of being paid including (but not limited to) a distribution, credit, debit, accrual of money but it does not 
extend to payments that are only deemed to be made for tax purposes and that do not involve the creation of 
economic rights between parties. Payment includes any amount capable of being paid including (but not limited 
to) a distribution, credit, debit, accrual of money but it does not extend to payments that are only deemed to be 
made for tax purposes and that do not involve the creation of economic rights between parties”. 
32
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 27, para. 28. 
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parties.
33
 Moreover, Recommendation 1 requires the payment to be made on the basis of a 
certain type of financing arrangement. In this context, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule 
encompasses  
i. arrangements that are treated as debt, equity or derivative contracts under local law 
(“financial instruments”);
34
 
ii. arrangements involving the transfer of financial instruments where differences in 
the tax treatment of that arrangement result in the same financial instrument being 
treated as held by more than one taxpayer (“hybrid transfers”);
35
 
iii. arrangements involving the transfer of financial instruments where a payment is 
made in substitution for the financing or equity return on the transferred asset and 
differences between the tax treatment of that payment and the underlying return on 
the instrument have the net-effect of undermining the integrity of the Hybrid Fi-
nancial Instrument Rule (“substitute payments”).
36
 
2.2.2.3.2 Hybrid Mismatch – D/NI-Outcome 
Furthermore, for the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule to apply the payment must give rise to 
a D/NI-outcome. According to the OECD, a is subject to a D/NI-outcome to the extent that it 
is deductible under the laws of the payer jurisdiction while being not included in income un-
der the laws of any jurisdiction where the payment is treated as being received (the payee ju-
risdiction).
37
 In this respect, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule only looks to the expected 
tax treatment of the arrangement, thereby taking into account the terms of the instrument and 
the character of the payments made under it, in order to determine whether the payment gives 
rise to a mismatch. As the OECD points out, the identification of such a hybrid mismatch un-
der a financial instrument is primarily a legal question that requires an analysis of the general 
rules for determining the character, amount, and timing of payments under a financial instru-
ment in the payer and payee jurisdictions.
38
 
 
Therefore, first, it has to be assessed whether the payment is, in fact, deductible at the level of 
the payer. A payment will be treated as “deductible” if, after a proper consideration of the 
character of the payment and its tax treatment under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, the 
payer is entitled to take the payment into account as a deduction in calculating its taxable in-
                                                
33
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 27, para. 28. 
34
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 25, para. 19 et seq. 
35
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 26, para. 23 et seq. 
36
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 26, para. 25 et seq. 
37
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 27, para. 29. 
38
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 40, para. 85. 
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come. Against this background, deductible payments made under a financial instrument will, 
for instance, include interest, as well as facilities and lending fees and payments under a de-
rivative contract to the extent they are treated as separate items of deductible expenditure.
39
 
 
However, a deductible payment only gives rise to a mismatch insofar as it is not included in 
income under the laws of any jurisdiction where the payment is treated as being received. 
Thus, the decisive criterion with regard to the payee jurisdiction is the inclusion in ordinary 
income. Ordinary income refers to those categories of income that are subject to tax at the 
taxpayer’s full marginal rate and that do not benefit from any exemption, exclusion, credit or 
other tax relief applicable to particular types of payments (such as indirect credits for underly-
ing tax on the income of the payer). A payment will be treated as included in ordinary income 
to the extent that, after a proper determination of the character and treatment of the payment 
under the laws of the payee jurisdiction, the payment is required to be incorporated as ordi-
nary income into a calculation of the payee’s taxable income. While the inclusion in ordinary 
income requires the payment to be subject to tax at the payee’s full marginal rate, this condi-
tion is also fulfilled in case the tax on the inclusion is reduced by a credit or other equivalent 
tax relief granted by the payee jurisdiction for withholding tax or other taxes imposed by the 
source jurisdiction on the payment itself.
40
 
2.2.2.3.3 Mismatch Must Be Attributable to the Terms of the Instrument 
Given a D/NI-outcome as illustrated above, for the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule to ap-
ply, the mismatch in tax treatment must be attributable to the terms of the instrument rather 
than the status of the taxpayer or the context in which the instrument is held.
41
 In other words, 
the application of Recommendation 1 requires a causal connection between the mismatch in 
tax outcomes and the terms of the underlying instrument. The Hybrid Mismatch Rules speci-
fies this causal link by means of a negative delimitation. According to Recommendation 1.3, 
“[a] payment cannot be attributed to the terms of the instrument where the mismatch is solely 
attributable to the status of the taxpayer or the circumstances in which the instrument is 
held.”
42
 As a consequence, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule does not apply to mis-
matches that are solely attributable to the circumstances under which an instrument is held.  
 
                                                
39
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 27, para. 30. 
40
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 28, para. 32. 
41
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 41, para. 92. 
42
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 24. 
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Therefore, if a loan is held through a foreign branch and the mismatch arises solely due to the 
operation of the branch exemption in the residence country then the mismatch will not be a 
hybrid mismatch for purposes of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule.
43
 The same is true 
where a taxpayer holds a bond issued by a company through a tax exempt savings account.
44
 
In such a case any mismatch in tax outcomes is not attributable to the terms of the instrument 
but the conditions under which the instrument is held.
45
 Furthermore, the conditions for the 
application are also not fulfilled with regard to a mismatch in tax treatment that arises in re-
spect of a cross-border payment made to a taxpayer in a pure territorial tax regime, i.e. a 
jurisdiction that excludes or exempts all foreign source income. In this scenario, the mismatch 
in tax outcomes will be attributable to the nature of the payer – more exactly: to the fact that 
the payer is a non-resident making a payment of foreign source income – rather than the terms 
of the instrument itself.
46
 Therefore, if a related non-resident payer makes a payment of de-
ductible interest that is treated as foreign source income and the payee jurisdiction does not 
tax income from foreign sources, the resulting mismatch is not attributable to the terms of the 
instrument but to the fact that the payee is exempt on all foreign source income. As a conse-
quence, the mismatch is not caught by the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule.
47
 According to 
the OECD, these cases are to be distinguished from situations where the tax exemption in the 
residence state of the recipient of the payment is limited to foreign dividend payments. Since 
in the latter case, the exemption on foreign source income applies only to a particular category 
of income, the tax exemption is not only depending on the source of the payment but, rather, 
on the character of the instrument under the laws of the payee jurisdiction and, therefore, the 
terms of the instrument itself.
48
 
2.2.2.3.4 Personal Scope 
Furthermore, in order to strike a balance between a rule that is clear and comprehensive and 
that is properly targeted and administrable, the OECD limits the scope of the Hybrid Finan-
cial Instrument Rule to payments made to “related persons” or under a “structured arrange-
ment”.
49
 On the one hand, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule covers payments made to a 
“related person”. According to recommendation 11.1.(a), persons are treated as related for the 
purposes of the hybrid mismatch rules if they are in the same control group or one person 
                                                
43
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 43, para. 97; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final 
Report, pp. 197 et seq., Example 1.8. 
44
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, pp. 201 et seq., Example 1.9. 
45
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 43, para. 97. 
46
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 43, para. 98; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final 
Report, pp. 195 et seq., Example 1.7. 
47
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 43, para. 98. 
48
 See, for example, OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, pp. 175 et seq., Example 1.1. 
49
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 44, para. 99. 
Lukas Mechtler/Cindy Wong  Mismatches in Tax Outcomes 
Page | 16  
holds a 25 % investment in the other or the same person holds a 25 % investment in both.
50
 
Two persons are in the same control group if (i) they are consolidated for accounting purpos-
es, (ii) the first person has an investment that provides that person with effective control of the 
second person or there is a third person that holds investments which provides that person 
with effective control over both persons, (iii) the first person has a 50% or greater investment 
in the second person or there is a third person that holds a 50% or greater investment in both; 
or (iv) they can be regarded as associated enterprises under Article 9 of the OECD Model 
Convention.
51
 In this context, in determining a person’s investment in another person one has 
to look to the percentage of voting rights or of the value of any equity interests that the first 
person holds in the second person.
52
  
 
On the other hand, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule applies to any person who is a party 
to a “structured arrangement”. This concept is defined by Recommendation 10. Accordingly, 
the term structured arrangement covers “any arrangement where the hybrid mismatch is 
priced into the terms of the arrangement or the facts and circumstances (including the terms) 
of the arrangement indicate that it has been designed to produce a hybrid mismatch.”
53
 The 
purpose of the structured arrangement definition is to capture those taxpayers who enter into 
arrangements that have been designed to produce a mismatch in tax outcomes while ensuring 
taxpayers will not be required to make adjustments under the rule in circumstances where the 
taxpayer is unaware of the mismatch and derives no benefit from it.
54
 However, even though 
the concept of a structured arrangement is focused on the deliberate exploitation of hybrid 
mismatches, the test for whether an arrangement is structured is objective. It applies, there-
fore, regardless of the parties’ intentions, whenever the facts and circumstances would indi-
cate to an objective observer that the arrangement has been designed to produce a mismatch 
in tax outcomes.
55
 This is especially the case if the mismatch has been priced into the terms of 
the arrangement. Moreover, a structured arrangement may also be given in case the arrange-
ment’s design and the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate that the mismatch in tax 
outcomes was an intended feature of the arrangement. In this context, the OECD test identi-
fies a set of non-exhaustive factors to be taken into consideration when determining whether 
                                                
50
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 114, para. 354; see also de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 
(at 18 et. seq.); Carman, Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.2.). 
51
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 113, Recommendation 11.1.(b); see also Carman, Deriva-
tives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.2.). 
52
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 114, para. 354. 
53
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 105, Recommendation 10.1. 
54
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 105 et seq, para. 318. 
55
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 106, para. 319. 
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an arrangement should be treated as structured.
56
 At the same time, the alternative require-
ment of a structured arrangement is only fulfilled if the concerned taxpayer is party to the 
arrangement. A person will be a party to an arrangement when that person has sufficient in-
volvement in the design of the arrangement to understand how it has been structured and what 
its tax effects might be. Therefore, a person will not be a party to a structured arrangement, if 
that person does not benefit from, and could not reasonably have been expected to be aware 
of, the mismatch arising under a structured arrangement.
57
 
2.2.2.3.5 Exceptions to the Rule 
Finally, the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule provides for an exception. By doing so, Rec-
ommendation 1.5 is intended to carve out situations where the tax policy of the deduction 
under the laws of the payer jurisdiction is to preserve tax neutrality for the payer and payee. 
As the OECD acknowledges, a jurisdiction may grant an investment vehicle the right to de-
duct dividend payments in order to preserve its tax neutrality.
58
 Notwithstanding the fact that 
the payment of a deductible dividend is likely to give rise to a mismatch in tax outcomes, such 
a payment will, in general, not lead to a hybrid mismatch for the purposes of the Hybrid Fi-
nancial Instrument Rule provided that any resulting mismatch will be attributable to the pay-
er’s tax status rather than the ordinary tax treatment of dividends under the laws of that juris-
diction.
59
 
2.2.3 Recommendation 2 – Specific Recommendations for the Tax Treatment of 
Financial Instruments 
2.2.3.1 Underlying Aim of Recommendation 2 
In addition to the hybrid mismatch rules, the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 contains a series 
of recommendation specifically targeted on the existing domestic tax systems thereby encour-
aging the national legislators to adopt their tax systems in order to avoid situations where hy-
brid mismatches may arise.
60
 Given the disparities between the tax systems around the globe, 
the OECD acknowledges that the domestic law changes required to implement Recommenda-
tion 2 will depend on the current state of a country’s domestic law.
61
 Rather than simply ad-
justing the tax treatment of a payment in order to align it with the tax consequences in another 
jurisdiction, the purpose of these recommendations goes further by seeking to bring the treat-
                                                
56
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 106, para. 319. 
57
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 106, para. 320. 
58
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 44, para. 101. 
59
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 44, para. 101. 
60
 See also de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 23 et. seq.) 
61
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, para. 105. 
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ment of these instruments into line with the tax policy outcomes that will generally apply to 
the same instruments in the wholly-domestic context.
62
 By doing so, the specific recommen-
dations are aimed at making hybrid mismatches less likely.  
2.2.3.2 Denial of dividend exemption for deductible payments 
The first specific recommendation presented by the OECD under Recommendation 2 is tar-
geted at domestic tax systems containing a participation exemption for dividend payments. In 
this context, first, the OECD highlights the underlying purpose and objective of a dividend 
exemption, i.e. to avoid imposing an additional layer of taxation at the shareholder level on 
income that has already been subject to tax at the entity level.
63
 Based thereon, Recommenda-
tion 2.1 recommends that jurisdictions providing payees with an exemption for dividends, as a 
mechanism for relieving economic double taxation on corporate profits, shall restrict that ex-
emption to payments that have, in fact, borne tax at the entity level.
64
 If a dividend payment 
gives rise to a deduction at the level of the distributing company, no such economic double 
taxation occurs. Consequently, given the underlying aim of the dividend exemption, there is 
also no reason to exempt the dividend payments in the hands of the receiving shareholder. 
Therefore, in such situations, the residence state of the recipient shall deny the participation 
exemption to the extent that the dividend payment is deductible by the payer.
65
 A dividend is 
deductible for the purposes of Recommendation 2.1, in case the issuer of the instrument under 
which the payment was made was entitled to a deduction for such payment. In contrast, where 
a dividend triggers a deduction in another jurisdiction for separate taxpayer due to the exist-
ence of a hybrid entity structure or under a hybrid transfer, the payment is not to be regarded 
as deductible for the purposes of Recommendation 2.1, and does, thus, not generally trigger a 
denial of the dividend exemption in the payee jurisdiction.
66
 
 
As the OECD points out, the recommendation only affects payments that would otherwise 
qualify for a dividend exemption or equivalent tax relief. Therefore, other types of non-
inclusion, such as a payment that is treated as a return of capital under a share, are not includ-
ed in the scope of Recommendation 2.1.
67
 With regard to the personal scope, however, the 
                                                
62
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, para. 104. 
63
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 46, para. 106. 
64
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 46, para. 106. 
65
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, Recommendation 2.1: “In order to prevent D/NI out-
comes from arising under a financial instrument, a dividend exemption that is provided for relief against economic 
double taxation should not be granted under domestic law to the extent the dividend payment is deductible by the 
payer. Equally, jurisdictions should consider adopting similar restrictions for other types of dividend relief granted 
to relieve economic double taxation on underlying profits.” 
66
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 46 et seq, para. 110. 
67
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 46, para. 109. 
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OECD does not provide for any limitations. Rather, since the underlying aim is to ensure the 
original purpose of the domestic dividend exemption, the amendment should apply to all de-
ductible dividend payments regardless of the relationship between the persons involved.
68
 
2.2.3.3 Restriction of foreign tax credits under a hybrid transfer 
The second domestic law recommendation proposed under Recommendation 2 deals with the 
issue of the duplication of tax credits under hybrid transfers.
69
 A hybrid transfer exploits dif-
ferences between two countries in their rules for attributing income from an asset with the 
effect that the same payment is treated as derived simultaneously by different taxpayers resi-
dent in different jurisdictions.
70
 Since there is only one underlying payment, however, the 
economic benefit of that payment will be shared between the parties under the terms of the 
hybrid transfer. Against this background, Recommendation 2.2 sets out a rule that aligns the 
rules for granting of foreign withholding tax relief with the economic benefit of the payment 
as shared under the terms of the hybrid transfer.
71
 Accordingly, countries that grant a tax cred-
it for source taxation should restrict the amount of the credit in proportion to the net taxable 
income of the relevant taxpayer under the arrangement.
72
 Given the underlying concept of 
Recommendation 2.2., i.e. to adapt the existing domestic legislation in order to ensure the tax 
treatment intended with regard to purely domestic situations, the OECD suggests no limita-
tions to the scope.
73
 
2.2.3.4 Interaction between Recommendation 2.1 and the Hybrid Financial Instrument 
Rule 
Since both the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule as well as the Specific Recommendation 2.1 
deal with the same types of hybrid mismatches, it could be questionable which one of these 
recommendations takes precedence with regard to D/NI-outcomes in connection with finan-
cial instruments. According to the concept followed by the OECD, the Hybrid Financial In-
strument Rule only operates to the extent the arrangement gives rise to a D/NI outcome.
74
 
However, such an outcome requires that, after a proper determination of the character and 
treatment of the payment under the laws of the payer and payee jurisdictions, a mismatch in 
                                                
68
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, Recommendation 2.3: “There is no limitation as to the 
scope of these recommendations.” 
69
 See, for example, de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 23). 
70
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 47, para. 112. 
71
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 47, para. 112. 
72
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, Recommendation 2.2: “In order to prevent duplication 
of tax credits under a hybrid transfer, any jurisdiction that grants relief for tax withheld at source on a payment 
made under a hybrid transfer should restrict the benefit of such relief in proportion to the net taxable income of the 
taxpayer under the arrangement.”; see also de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 23). 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 45, Recommendation 2.3: “There is no limitation as to the 
scope of these recommendations.” 
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 See already Section 2.2.2.3 above. 
Lukas Mechtler/Cindy Wong  Mismatches in Tax Outcomes 
Page | 20  
tax outcomes has arisen. In this context, it has to be noted that a proper consideration of the 
character of the payment and its tax treatment in both jurisdictions will take into account rules 
in the payee jurisdiction designed to limit double taxation relief on dividend payments made 
out of after-tax profits.
75
  
 
As a consequence, a payment under a hybrid financial instrument will not be treated as giving 
rise to a D/NI outcome if the mismatch will be neutralised in the counterparty jurisdiction by 
a specific rule designed to align the tax treatment of the payment with tax policy outcomes 
applicable to an instrument of that nature. If the payee jurisdiction does not extend its divi-
dend exemption to a payment that is deductible under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, then 
no mismatch will arise for the purposes of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule.
76
 Since the 
Specific Recommendations may obviate the need for the application of hybrid mismatch 
rules, they are to be implemented and applied primarily. Therefore, in case the state of resi-
dence of the recipient denies the participation to the extent that the payment has given rise to 
a deduction at the level of the distributing company, there is no D/NI-outcome as required 
under the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule. Consequently, there is no room for an applica-
tion of the primary response of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule in the source state.
77
  
2.2.4 Recommendation 3 – Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule 
2.2.4.1 Starting Point: D/NI-Outcome 
Furthermore, the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 deals with D/NI-outcomes generated in con-
nection with hybrid entities. In this context, the OECD, first, focuses on payments made by a 
hybrid entity. While the payment gives rise to a deduction at the level of the hybrid entity, it is 
disregarded, and thus not taxed, in the hands of the receiving taxpayer. Consider the following 
example: 
                                                
75
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 29, para. 35. 
76
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – 2015 Final Report, p. 29, para. 35. 
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A Co, resident in State A, establishes the 100 % subsidiary B Co 1, resident in State B, as the 
holding company for its operating subsidiary B Co 2. B Co 1 is a hybrid entity, i.e. an entity 
that is treated as a separate entity for tax purposes in State B but treated as transparent under 
the laws of State A. In contrast, B Co 2 is treated as a separate taxable entity in State A and in 
State B.  
 
B Co 1 borrows money from A Co for the purpose of on-lending that money under a hybrid 
loan to B Co 2. Due to the diverging tax treatment of the hybrid loan, interest payments on the 
loan are treated as ordinary income in State B but treated as exempt dividends under the laws 
of State A. Since Stat A considers B Co 1 as transparent entity for tax purposes, the interest 
on the loan between A Co and B Co 1 is disregarded for tax purposes and does not give rise to 
taxable income in State A. Furthermore, although the payment of interest on the hybrid loan is 
recognised in State A law, it is treated as an exempt dividend for tax purposes and is, thus, not 
taken into account in determining A Co’s taxable income.  
 
Accordingly, A Co receives no taxable income under this structure. At the same time, B Co 2 
generates operating income of 400 while being entitled to a deduction of 300 on the hybrid 
loan. B Co 1 recognises the interest payment on the hybrid loan but is further entitled to a 
deduction of 200 on the disregarded interest payment to A Co. As a consequence, in total, the 
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group for tax purposes in State B recognises 200 of taxable income under this structure on a 
net return of 400. 
2.2.4.2 Underlying Principle and Legal consequences 
Against this background, the OECD proposes the implementation of a linking rule that aligns 
the tax outcomes for the payer and payee.
78
 For this purpose, the Disregarded Hybrid Pay-
ments Rule provides for a two-steps approach:
79
 The primary recommendation under the Dis-
regarded Hybrid Payments Rule is that the payer jurisdiction should deny the deduction that 
can be claimed for a disregarded payment insofar as the deduction is available to be set-off 
against an amount that is not treated as income under the laws of the payee jurisdiction (i.e. 
against income that is not “dual inclusion income”).
80
 In the event the payer jurisdiction does 
not implement or apply the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule, the payee jurisdiction shall 
apply a defensive rule requiring the disregarded payment to be included in ordinary income.
81
 
 
Although the root cause of the D/NI-outcome is to be seen in the diverging tax treatment of 
the hybrid payer, the OECD does not intend to solve the underlying qualification conflict. 
Rather, by way of referring to the tax outcomes related therewith, the Disregarded Hybrid 
Payments Rule is aimed at neutralising the unintended effects of the hybrid mismatch ar-
rangement. However, mere timing and quantification differences should not be treated as giv-
ing rise to mismatches in tax outcomes under Recommendation 3. Therefore, excess deduc-
tions that are subject to restriction in the payer jurisdiction under the Disregarded Hybrid 
Payments Rule may be carried over to another period, in accordance with the ordinary rules 
for the treatment of net losses in the respective state, and be applied against dual inclusion 
income in that period.
82
 
2.2.4.3 Conditions for the application 
2.2.4.3.1 Disregarded Payment made by a Hybrid Payer 
The application of the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule requires a disregarded payment, 
i.e. a payment that is deductible under the laws of the payer jurisdiction and is not recognised 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 50, para. 119. 
79
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 50, para. 119; see also Carman, Derivatives & Financial Instru-
ments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.3.). 
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ments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.3.). 
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under the laws of the payee jurisdiction.
83
 Therefore, first, the deductibility of the payment 
has to be determined. As the OECD points out, the meaning of deductible and deduction is the 
same as that used in the other recommendations in the report and generally includes items of 
current expenditure such as service payments, rents, royalties, interest and other amounts that 
may be set-off directly against ordinary income while not covering the cost of acquiring a 
capital asset or an allowance for depreciation or amortization.
84
 Secondly, the payment must 
be disregarded under the laws of the payee jurisdiction. This is the case if the payment is not 
treated as a payment under the laws of the payee jurisdiction or that is not otherwise taken 
into account as a receipt for tax purposes.
85
 Based thereon, the Disregarded Hybrid Payments 
Rule only applies if the non-recognition of the payment in the payee jurisdiction is due to the 
tax treatment of the hybrid payer.
86
  
2.2.4.3.2 D/NI-Outcome – Deduction vs Dual Inclusion Income 
Furthermore, for the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule to apply the payment must result in 
a hybrid mismatch. According to Recommendation 3.3, a disregarded payment made by a 
hybrid payer results in a hybrid mismatch if, under the laws of the payer jurisdiction, the de-
duction may be set-off against income that is not dual inclusion income. As the OECD 
acknowledges, there are a number of different techniques that a taxpayer can use in the payer 
jurisdiction to set-off a double deduction against non-dual inclusion income the most common 
one being the use of a tax consolidation or grouping regime that allows the payer to apply the 
benefit of a deduction against the income of another entity within the same group.
87
 However, 
the application of the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule is not limited to certain techniques 
used to generate the offset. Rather, if the effect of the structure is to create the opportunity for 
a deduction under a disregarded payment to be set-off against income that will not be brought 
into account as ordinary income under the laws of the payee jurisdiction, this will be suffi-
cient to bring the payment within the scope of the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule.
88
  
 
At the same time, no mismatch will arise to the extent that the deduction in the payer jurisdic-
tion is set-off against income that is included in income under the laws of both the payee and 
                                                
83
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 49, Recommendation 3.2.(a). 
84
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 51, para. 121. 
85
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 53, para. 133. 
86
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 49, Recommendation 3.2.(b): “A person will be a hybrid payer 
where the tax treatment of the payer under the laws of the payee jurisdiction causes the payment to be a disre-
garded payment.”. 
87
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, pp. 293 et seq., Example 3.2. 
88
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 54, para. 137. 
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the payer jurisdiction.
89
 Against this background, the applicability of the Disregarded Hybrid 
Payments Rule decisively depends on the amount of dual inclusion income. According to the 
concept followed by the OECD, the identification of whether an item should be treated as 
dual inclusion income requires a comparison of the treatment of the income under the laws of 
the payer and payee jurisdictions.
90
 In this context, an amount should be treated as dual inclu-
sion income if it is included in income under the laws of both jurisdictions even if there are 
differences in the way those jurisdictions value that item or in the accounting period in which 
the income is derived. Furthermore, double taxation relief, such as a domestic dividend ex-
emption granted by the payer jurisdiction or a foreign tax credit granted by the payee jurisdic-
tion should not prevent an item from being treated as dual inclusion income where the effect 
of such relief is simply to avoid subjecting the income to an additional layer of taxation in 
either jurisdiction.
91
 As a consequence, also the adjustment under the disregarded hybrid 
payments rule only operates to the extent that the interest payment exceeds dual inclusion 
income for the hybrid entity in the payer jurisdiction.
92
 
2.2.4.3.3 Personal Scope 
Moreover, with regard to the personal scope, the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule sets 
forth two alternative requirements. On the one hand, the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule 
applies to payments made under a structured arrangement provided that the taxpayer is party 
to that arrangement. In this respect, Recommendation 3 follows the Hybrid Financial Instru-
ment Rule.
93
 On the other hand, alternatively, the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule covers 
payments within the same control group. While the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule, in this 
context, refers to payments to a related person, the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule fol-
lows the narrower concept of the same control group.
94
 In order to define the concepts of the 
structured arrangement as well as the same control group, the OECD refers to the general def-
inition provided for under Recommendation 10 and 11.
95
 
                                                
89
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 54, para. 135. 
90
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 51, para. 125. 
91
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 52, para. 126. 
92
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 51, para. 124. 
93
 See with regard to the personal scope of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule Section 2.2.2.3.4 above. 
94
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 49, Recommendation 3.4.: “This rule only applies if the parties to 
the mismatch are in the same control group“; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 54, para. 138; 
Kahlenberg, NWB 2015, 490 (at 492). 
95
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 54, para. 138. 
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2.2.5 Recommendation 4 – Reverse Hybrid Rule 
2.2.5.1 Starting Point: D/NI-Outcome 
As a further measure to deal with D/NI-outcomes generated by use of hybrid entities, the 
OECD proposes a specific linking rule aimed at Reverse Hybrid structures. In general, the 
hybrid mismatches referred to in this context are due to the interplay of three different juris-
dictions: the jurisdiction where the hybrid entity is established (establishment jurisdiction), 
the residence state of the investor (investor jurisdiction) and the source state of the payment 
(payer jurisdiction). While the hybrid entity is considered as transparent for tax purposes in its 
establishment jurisdiction, the investor jurisdiction treats the hybrid entity as a separate tax-
payer (Reverse Hybrid).
96
 The following example illustrates the D/NI-outcomes resulting 
from this diverging qualification of the hybrid entity:
97
 
 
 
In this example, two individuals, one resident in State A (Individual A), the other one resident 
in State B (Individual B) intend to make a loan to A Co, a company resident in State A and 
wholly owned by Individual A. Instead of a direct loan, A and B interpose B Co, an entity 
incorporated in State B that loans money to A Co. Consequently, the interest payment on the 
loan is deductible at the level of A Co. However, due to the interposition of the hybrid entity 
                                                
96
 See with regard to the D/NI-outcomes resulting from this diverging treatment, for example, Carman, Derivatives 
& Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.4.); Kahlenberg/Kudert, SWI 2015, 52 (at 56); Valta, 
ISR 2014, 249 (at 252). 
97
 The following graphics is based on the work of the OECD on BEPS Action 2 (see OECD (2015), Action 2 – 
Final Report pp. 302 et seq., Example 4.2). 
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B Co, only half of the payment is taxed at the level of the recipient: According to the laws in 
State B, 50 % of the payments is attributed to Individual A and is exempt from tax as foreign 
source income of a non-resident. However, since State A treats B Co as a separate entity for 
tax purposes, no amount of the payment is included in income under Country A law. The oth-
er half of the payment is attributed to Individual B and is subject to tax at the full marginal 
rate applicable to interest income. As a result, half of the payment is deductible in the payer 
jurisdiction and not included in ordinary income by a taxpayer under the laws of any other 
jurisdiction where the payment is treated as being received.
98
 
2.2.5.2 Underlying Principle and Legal consequences 
In order to tackle the D/NI-outcome illustrated above, the OECD proposes the implementa-
tion of a linking rule that denies a deduction for such payments to the extent they give rise to 
a D/NI-outcome.
99
 Given the risk of double taxation, the adjustment should be no more than 
is necessary to neutralise the hybrid effect that results from interposing the Reverse Hybrid 
between the payer and the investor.
100
 Therefore, if part of the payment remains subject to tax 
in the investor or establishment jurisdiction then that part of the payment should remain de-
ductible.
101
 In contrast to the other hybrid mismatch rules, the Reverse Hybrid Rule does not 
provide for a secondary (defensive) linking rule.
102
 Given the specific recommendations to 
adopt or enhance CFC or other offshore investment legislation that would require payments to 
a Reverse Hybrid to be included in income in the investor jurisdiction,
103
 according to the 
OECD, there is no need for a defensive rule.
104
 Consequently, the Reverse Hybrid Rule is only 
targeted at the source state of the payment. 
2.2.5.3 Conditions for the Application 
2.2.5.3.1 Payment to a Reverse Hybrid 
The application of the Reverse Hybrid Rule requires a payment made to a hybrid entity. In 
accordance with the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule,
105
 the Reverse Hybrid Rule encom-
passes any amount that is capable of being paid including a distribution, credit or accrual.
106
 
                                                
98
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 302 et seq., Example 4.2 (at p. 303, para. 7 et seq.). 
99
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 56, para. 144; see also de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 
(at 27); Carman, Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Chapter 3.4.). 
100
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 59, para. 155. 
101
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 302 et seq., Example 4.2 (at p. 303, para. 7 et seq.). 
102
 See, for example, Staats, IStR 2014, 749 (at 753); de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 27). 
103
 See Section 2.2.6 below. 
104
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 56, para. 144; see also Janssens/Ledure/Vandepitte/Loos, 
ET 2015, 279 (at 285). 
105
 See Section 2.2.2.3.1 above. 
106
 According to the OECD, Deductible payments generally include current expenditures such as rents, royalties, 
interest, payments for services and other payments that may be set-off against ordinary income under the laws of 
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Furthermore, for the payment to be covered it has to be made to a Reverse Hybrid.
107
 Accord-
ing to the Final Report on BEPS Action 2, a Reverse Hybrid is any person including an unin-
corporated body of persons such as a trust that is treated as transparent under the laws of the 
jurisdiction where it is established but as a separate entity in the investor jurisdiction.
108
 
Therefore, the applicability of the Reverse Hybrid Rule depends on the qualification of the 
receiving hybrid entity in the states concerned: On the one hand, the hybrid entity must be 
treated as transparent
109
 for tax purposes in its establishment jurisdiction.
110
 On the other 
hand, the hybrid entity must be treated as a separate entity under the laws of the investor ju-
risdiction.
111
 
2.2.5.3.2 D/NI-Outcome 
In addition, the application of the Reverse Hybrid Rule requires the payment to the Reverse 
Hybrid to give rise to a D/NI-outcome. According to the OECD, such a D/NI-outcome will 
arise to the extent that the payment is deductible under the laws of the payer jurisdiction and 
not included in ordinary income by a taxpayer under the laws of any other jurisdiction where 
the payment is treated as being received.
112
 As the OECD points out, when determining 
whether the payment is subject to a D/NI-outcome, the general rules in the investor jurisdic-
tion are to be applied to the payment that is made to the Reverse Hybrid thereby identifying 
the character, amount and tax treatment of that payment and whether it would have been 
treated as ordinary income if it had been paid directly to the investor.
113
  
 
                                                                                                                                                   
the payer jurisdiction in the period they are treated as made (see OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 56, 
para. 145). 
107
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 55, Recommendation 4.2. 
108
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 59, para. 157. 
109
 According to the OECD, a person will be treated as transparent under the laws of the establishment jurisdiction 
if the laws of that jurisdiction permit or require the person to allocate or attribute ordinary income to an investor 
and such allocation or attribution has the effect that the payment is not included in the income of any other tax-
payer (see OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 59, para. 160). 
110
 The establishment jurisdiction will, in the case of entities that are formed by incorporation or registration, be the 
jurisdiction where that person is registered or established. For entities that can be formed without formal incorpo-
ration or registration requirements (such as partnerships and trusts) the establishment jurisdiction will be the juris-
diction under which the entity has been created and/or where the directors (or equivalent) perform their functions 
(see OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 59, para. 159). See also OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, 
p. 122, Recommendation 12: “Establishment jurisdiction, in relation to any person, means the jurisdiction where 
that person is incorporated or otherwise established.”; OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report  p. 126, para. 397: 
„[B] For entities such as companies that are established by formal registration this will be the jurisdiction where 
the entity is registered. For entities such as partnerships or trusts that may not require formal registration, this will 
be the jurisdiction under whose laws the entity is created or operates.“). 
111
 According to the OECD, if the allocation or attribution of ordinary income by the intermediary will not have any 
tax consequences for the investor under the laws of the investor jurisdiction, then the intermediary should be 
considered opaque under the laws of the investor jurisdiction (see OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 60, 
para. 163). 
112
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 57, para. 147. 
113
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 60, para. 165. 
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On the one hand, the deductibility of the payment at the level of the payer has to be assessed. 
In this context, the deduction in any jurisdiction is sufficient to trigger the application of the 
Reverse Hybrid Rule.
114
 In case the payment is made by a hybrid entity and is, thus, treated as 
made from more than one jurisdiction, the deduction of the payment in the other jurisdiction 
is not relevant to the question of whether the payment gives rise to a D/NI outcome under the 
laws of the jurisdiction applying the Reverse Hybrid Rule. Rather, according to the concept 
followed by the Final Report on BEPS Action 2, the Reverse Hybrid Rule should be applied 
in both the parent and subsidiary jurisdictions in order to neutralise the effect of the mismatch. 
Consequently, the application of the Reverse Hybrid Rule in one jurisdiction does not impact 
on its application in the other.
115
 
 
On the other hand, a deductible payment only leads to a D/NI-outcome covered by the Re-
verse Hybrid Rule if neither the establishment jurisdiction nor the investor jurisdiction 
includes the payment when calculation the ordinary income. In other words, if the payment is 
brought into account as ordinary income in at least one jurisdiction –be it due to a CFC legis-
lation or any other offshore investments regime
116
 – then there will be no mismatch for the 
rule to apply to.
117
 Therefore, a payment to a Reverse Hybrid will not be treated as giving rise 
to a D/NI outcome if the mismatch is neutralised by the investor or the establishment jurisdic-
tion adopting a specific rule designed to bring into account items of ordinary income paid to a 
Reverse Hybrid.
118
 As the OECD points out, in this context the burden is on the taxpayer to 
establish, to the satisfaction of the tax administration, the extent to which the payment: 
i. Has been fully included under the laws of the investor jurisdiction and is sub-
ject to tax at the full rate. 
ii. Has not been treated as reduced or offset by any deduction or other relief other 
than in respect of expenditure incurred by the investor under the laws of the 
investor jurisdiction. 
iii. Does not carry an entitlement to any credit or other relief. 
iv. Does not give rise to an imported mismatch.119 
                                                
114
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 57, para. 148. 
115
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 57, para. 148. 
116
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 305 et seq., Example 4.3 (at 306, para. 5 et seq.); see also See 
OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 58, para. 151; in detail to the interplay between the Recommendations 
under BEPS Actions 2 and 3 Kahlenberg, The Interplay between the OECD Recommendations of Actions 2 and 3 
Regarding Hybrid Structures, Intertax 2016, 316 (at 316 et seq.). 
117
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 57, para. 149. 
118
 A payment that has been fully attributed to the ultimate parent of the group under a CFC regime and has been 
subject to tax at the full rate should be treated as having been included in ordinary income for the purposes of the 
Reverse Hybrid Rule. 
119
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 57 et seq., para. 150, 154. 
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According to the concept of the Reverse Hybrid Rule, a payment does, however, only give 
rise to a relevant mismatch if the payment attributed to the investor would have been included 
as ordinary income if it had been paid directly to the investor.
120
 In other words, the interposi-
tion of the Reverse Hybrid must have been necessary to bring about the mismatch in tax out-
comes. Therefore, where income is allocated by a Reverse Hybrid to a tax exempt entity, the 
payment would not have been taxable even if it had been made directly to the investor and the 
Reverse Hybrid Rule will not apply to deny the deduction.
121
 
2.2.5.3.3 Personal Scope 
As it regards the personal scope, the Reverse Hybrid Rule, on the one hand, encompasses 
payments within a structured arrangement provided that the respective taxpayer is a party to 
the structured arrangement.
122
 In this respect, the Reverse Hybrid Rule follows the Hybrid 
Financial Instrument Rule as well as the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule.
123
 At the same 
time, the Reverse Hybrid Rule also covers situations where the receiving Reverse Hybrid and 
the payer are part of the same control group.
124
 With respect to the second alternative, the 
Reverse Hybrid Rule follows the narrower concept of the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule, 
i.e. to cover only payments within a control group instead of payments to a related person. 
Also in this context, the OECD refers to the definition provided for under Recommenda-
tion 10 and 11.
125
 
2.2.6 Recommendation 5 – Specific Recommendations for the Tax Treatment of 
Reverse Hybrids 
2.2.6.1 Underlying Aim of Recommendation 5 
In addition to the hybrid mismatch rules proposed in order to tackle D/NI-outcomes generated 
by using hybrid entities, the OECD presents some specific recommendations with regard to 
                                                
120
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 55, Recommendation 4.3: “A payment results in a hybrid mis-
match if a mismatch would not have arisen had the accrued income been paid directly to the investor.” 
121
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 60, para. 166; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, 
pp. 299 et seq., Example 4.1 (at 300, para. 6); OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, pp. 307 et seq., Exam-
ple 4.4 (at 308, para. 10)). 
122
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 55, Recommendation 4.4.: “The recommendation only applies 
[B] if the payment is made under a structured arrangement and the payer is party to that structured arrange-
ment.“; see also OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, pp. 299 et seq., Example 4.1 (at 300 et seq., para. 7 et 
seq.). 
123
 See with regard to the personal scope of the Hybrid Financial Instrument Rule Section 2.2.2.3.4 above and 
with respect to the Disregarded Hybrid Payments Rule Section2.2.4.3.3 above. 
124
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 55, Recommendation 4.4.: “The recommendation only applies 
where the investor, the reverse hybrid and the payer are members of the same control group [B].“; see also Car-
man, Derivatives & Financial Instruments 2015 (Volume 17) Nr 3 (Kapitel 3.4.). 
125
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 61, para. 168; see with regard to these concepts already Sec-
tion 2.2.2.3.4 above. 
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the tax treatment of transparent entities.
126
 In this context, Recommendation 5 sets out three 
specific recommendations covering, on the one hand, the tax treatment of payments made to a 
Reverse Hybrid under the laws of the investor and establishment jurisdiction and, on the other 
hand, recommendations on tax filing and information requirements in order to assist both tax-
payers and tax administrations to make a proper determination of the payments that have been 
attributed to that non-resident investor.
127
 As the OECD explicitly points out, these specific 
recommendations are not hybrid mismatch rules. Consequently, they do not adjust the tax 
consequences of a payment because of differences in its tax treatment in another jurisdiction. 
Rather, Recommendation 5 is targeted at the national tax legislators setting out improvements 
that jurisdictions could make to their domestic law in order to reduce the frequency of hybrid 
mismatches. According to the underlying purpose of Recommendation 5, these specific rec-
ommendations are aimed at bringing the tax treatment of cross-border payments made to 
transparent entities into line with the tax policy outcomes that would generally be expected to 
apply to payments between domestic taxpayers.
128
 
2.2.6.2 Improvements to CFC and Other Offshore Investment Regimes 
First, the OECD deals with the tax treatment of payments made through a Reverse Hybrid 
structure. According to the Final Report on BEPS Action 2, such payments will not result in 
D/NI-outcomes if the income is fully taxed under a CFC-regime or a similar anti-deferral rule 
in the investor jurisdiction requiring the investor to include its allocated share of any payment 
of ordinary income made to the intermediary on a current basis.
129
 Based thereon, the OECD 
discusses different possibilities to achieve the intended taxation at the level of the investors. 
In this context, the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 mentions changes to residency rules, CFC 
rules, and rules that tax a resident investor on changes in the market value of the invest-
ment.
130
  
 
According to the OECD, an offshore investment regime in the investor jurisdiction could iso-
late the requirement of the tax transparency of the Reverse Hybrid thereby ensuring a taxation 
of the investors on the amount of income allocated to them. As the Final Report on BEPS 
Action 2 emphasises, treating income allocated by a Reverse Hybrid as taxable at the level of 
the investor would have the effect of neutralising any hybrid mismatch under a payment to a 
                                                
126
 See de Boer/Marres, Intertax 2015, 14 (at 26 et seq.). 
127
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 63, para. 169. 
128
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 63, para. 170. 
129
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 171. 
130
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 172. 
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transparent entity.
131
 Against this background, Recommendation 5.1 recommends that juris-
dictions introduce or extend their offshore investment regimes to require a taxpayer to take 
into account, for tax purposes, any item of ordinary income allocated to that taxpayer by a 
Reverse Hybrid.
132
 Given these consequences of the adoption of an offshore investment re-
gime, the payer jurisdiction could suspend the application of the Reverse Hybrid Rule insofar 
as payments were allocated to investors in the investor jurisdiction.
133
 
2.2.6.3 Limiting the Tax Transparency for Non-Resident Investors 
Furthermore, Recommendation 5 focuses on the underlying principle of the concept of tax 
transparency and its application to reverse hybrids. As the OECD acknowledges, the treat-
ment of an entity as transparent for tax purposes is an effective way for collective investment 
vehicles to ensure tax neutrality of outcomes for different investors that are subject to differ-
ent marginal rates of taxation.
134
 At the same time, the OECD emphasises the underlying as-
sumption of this treatment, i.e. that the income allocated to the investor will be taxable in the 
hands of the investor.
135
 However, in a cross-border context, this is not always the case. 
Against this backdrop, Recommendation 5.2 stipulates that “[a] reverse hybrid should be 
treated as a resident taxpayer in the establishment jurisdiction if the income of the reverse 
hybrid is not brought within the charge to taxation under the laws of the establishment juris-
diction and the accrued income of a non-resident investor in the same control group as the 
reverse hybrid is not brought within the charge to taxation under the laws of the investor ju-
risdiction.”
136
 By doing so, Recommendation 5.2 is intended to prevent a non-resident taking 
advantage of a person’s tax transparency in order to achieve a mismatch in tax outcomes.
137
 
Recommendation 5.2. only applies in circumstances where: 
i. the person is tax transparent under the laws of the establishment jurisdiction, 
ii. the person derives foreign sourced income or income that is not otherwise sub-
ject to taxation in the establishment jurisdiction, and 
iii. all or part of that income is allocated under the laws of the establishment juris-
diction to a non-resident investor that is in the same control group as that per-
son.
138
 
                                                
131
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 173. 
132
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 63, Recommendation 5.1: “Jurisdictions should introduce, or 
make changes to, their offshore investment regimes in order to prevent D/NI outcomes from arising in respect of  
payments to a reverse hybrid.“. 
133
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 173. 
134
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 174. 
135
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 174. 
136
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 63, Recommendation 5.2. 
137
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64, para. 174. 
138
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64 et seq., para. 175. 
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In order to avoid such hybrid mismatches connected with tax transparency rules, Recommen-
dation 5.2 provides that the establishment jurisdiction should treat the Reverse Hybrid as if it 
were a resident taxpayer. By doing so, as the OECD points out, the need to apply the Reverse 
Hybrid Rule to such entities will be eliminated.
139
 Furthermore, the investor jurisdiction could 
continue to include such payments in income under Recommendation 5.1 but provide a credit 
for any taxes paid in the establishment jurisdiction on the income that is brought into account 
under such rules.
140
 
2.2.6.4 Information Reporting for Intermediaries 
Finally, when dealing with the tax treatment of reverse hybrids, the OECD focuses on the 
reporting and filing requirements for tax transparent entities. In this context, Recommenda-
tion 5.3 is intended to encourage jurisdictions to maintain appropriate reporting and filing 
requirements for such entities that are established within that jurisdiction.
141
 According to the 
Final Report on BEPS Action 2, this would involve the maintenance of accurate records of 
who their investors are, how much of an investment each investor holds in the entity and the 
amount of income and expenditure allocated to those investors including the categories of 
income and expenditure as determined under the relevant tax or accounting standard.
142
 In 
order to assist both taxpayers and tax administrations to make a proper determination of the 
payments that have been attributed to that non-resident investor, these records should be made 
available, on request, to both investors and to the tax administration in the establishment ju-
risdiction.
143
 With regard to the legal basis for the information exchange between tax authori-
ties, the OECD refers to Article 26 of the OECD Model Convention as well as the Multilat-
eral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, Amended by the 2010 
Protocol (Multilateral Convention).
144
  
2.2.7 Concluding Remarks 
Given the various recommendations presented by the OECD with regard to the domestic law 
in order to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, it is fair to say that these 
proposals are likely to address the issue of double non-taxation due to the diverging qualifica-
tion of hybrid financial instruments and hybrid entities effectively. This is mainly due to the 
concept followed by the OECD. Accordingly, the Final Report on BEPS Action 2 does not 
define the covered hybrid financial instruments and hybrid entity structures. Rather, the 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64 et seq., para. 175. 
140
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 64 et seq., para. 175. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 65, para. 176. 
142
 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 65, para. 176, para. 179. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 65, para. 176. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 2 – Final Report, p. 65, para. 178. 
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OECD looks at the unintended outcome for tax purposes connected therewith when determin-
ing the scope of the proposed provisions. As a consequence, all the different types of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements are covered in case they lead to a D/NI- or DD-outcome as defined 
by the respective recommendation. At the same time, it has to be noted that, according to the 
concept followed by the Final Report, the application of the linking rules does not require the 
actual lowering of the tax burden as a consequence of the hybrid mismatch arrangement. Ra-
ther, and in contrast to the Deliverable on BEPS Action 2,
145
 the final Linking Rules are 
aimed at eliminating mismatches without requiring the jurisdiction applying the rule to estab-
lish that it has “lost” tax revenue under the arrangement. Therefore, while neutralising the 
effect of hybrid mismatch arrangements will address the risks to a jurisdiction’s tax base, this 
will not be achieved by capturing additional revenue under the hybrid mismatch rules them-
selves.  
 
As the OECD points out, the rules are intended to drive taxpayers towards less complicated 
and more transparent tax structuring that is easier for jurisdictions to address with more or-
thodox tax policy tools.
146
 As a consequence, the hybrid mismatch rules are intended to apply 
automatically and without regard for whether the arrangement has eroded the tax base of the 
country applying the rule. The underlying considerations of this approach are, on the one 
hand, to assure consistency in the application of the rules and their outcomes between juris-
dictions and, on the other hand, to avoid the practical and conceptual difficulties in distin-
guishing between acceptable and unacceptable mismatches or trying to allocate taxing rights 
based on the extent to which a country’s tax base has been eroded through the hybrid mis-
match arrangement.
147
 The concept of the OECD requires a consistent and coordinated im-
plementation and application of the proposed linking rules in order to ensure predictability of 
outcomes for taxpayers and to avoid the risk of double taxation. Bearing in mind, however, 
the lack of legal obligation to transpose the recommendations of the OECD into domestic law, 
it remains doubtful whether this goal is, in fact, likely to be achieved. Rather, it is far from 
certain if and to what extent the member states of the OECD, as well as other states, will enact 
a domestic provision in accordance with the proposed linking rules. Consequently, there will 
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be a risk of inconsistency and non-coordination possibly leading to unwanted results such as 
double taxation. 
 
Notwithstanding the general potential to address effectively the issue of hybrid mismatch ar-
rangements, the linking rules proposed by the OECD are only aimed at neutralising their ef-
fects while leaving the underlying qualification conflict of the financial instrument or the enti-
ty untouched. In this context, the OECD refers to the lack of political willingness to achieve a 
harmonised tax treatment of entities, instruments, and transfers in order to eliminate the 
commonly exploited differences.
148
 However, given that the root cause for hybrid mismatch-
es, i.e. the qualification conflict is not eliminated by the linking rules, such mismatches in tax 
outcomes are likely to continue to exist. Consequently, in response to the implementation of 
the linking rules proposed by the OECD, affected taxpayers are likely to restructure their ex-
isting arrangements in an effort to preserve the effects for tax purposes including transactions 
with low or no tax jurisdictions or transactions where returns are exempt from taxation in the 
payee jurisdiction on the basis that that jurisdiction operates on a territorial basis of taxation. 
As a result, and given that the existing differences between national tax laws are not affected 
by the linking rules, taxpayers face the opportunity to replace their hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments by other structures which may still achieve a D/NI-outcome while being explicitly out-
side the operation of the recommendations presented in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2. 
2.3 Implementation of BEPS Action 2 into Domestic Law 
2.3.1 General Considerations – BEPS Action 2 in the Light of the Different Economic 
and Legal Environments 
Against the background of the various recommendations presented by the OECD with regard 
to D/NI-outcomes, the following part will deal with the implementation of these proposals 
into domestic law. In this context, it has to be noted that the recommendations presented by 
the OECD face different economic and legal environments around the globe. Given the exist-
ing disparities with regard to the tax concepts established by sovereign tax legislators as well 
as the underlying policy considerations,
149
 there is a rather uneven picture of the implementa-
tion of the proposed linking rules into domestic law. Therefore, the authors will analyse the 
different approaches that can be identified with regard to the linking rules of the OECD. On 
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the one hand, the authors will focus on the Asia-Pacific region thereby giving special atten-
tion to Australia as a member state of the OECD that has already announced to implement the 
recommendation under BEPS Action 2. On the other hand, the paper will deal with the im-
plementation of the linking rules in Europe. In this context, special attention will be given to 
the recently concluded Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive as a result of the work undertaken at the 
level of the EU with regard to BEPS. Finally, and based on the interim findings, the authors 
will analyse the impact of the recommendations presented by the OECD on non-member 
states thereby focusing on Singapore that is neither a member state of the OECD nor of the 
EU.  
2.3.2 Implementation of the Linking Rules in the OECD Member States in Asia-Pacific 
2.3.2.1 Australia as the Leading Player with Respect to the Implementation of 
BEPS Action 2 
When analysing the implementation of the linking rules proposed by the OECD in Asia-
Pacific, it has to be noted that the practical importance of these proposals varies significantly 
throughout the different jurisdictions. This is due to the fact that the use of hybrid arrange-
ments and their importance for tax planning purposes differ as well. In this context, hybrid 
mismatch arrangements, at least in the past few years, played an important role with regard to 
structuring business relations with Australia. Accordingly, Australia also seems to play an 
important role in the course of the implementation of BEPS measures in the Asia-pacific re-
gion. Given the report of the Board of Taxation (BOT) on the “Implementation of the OECD 
Hybrid Mismatch Rules” released in March 2016, Australia is very likely to implement to a 
full load of recommendations under BEPS Action 2 and can be, therefore, considered the 
leading player in this respect. 
2.3.2.2 BOT Report 2016: Implementation of Several OECD Recommendations 
In its report to the treasurer released in March 2016, the BOT presents, in total, 17 recom-
mendations with regard to the implementation of BEPS Action 2 in Australia. As a starting 
point, the BOT emphasises the commitment of the Australian Government to eliminate, in 
partnership with the OECD and through the G20, the tax advantage arising from the use of 
hybrid instruments and hybrid entities whilst ensuring investment activity is not compromised 
and that Australia remains an economically competitive place to do business. Based thereon, 
the report, first, notes that Australia already has comprehensive rules to address a number of 
the BEPS measures including thin capitalisation rules, CFC rules, transfer pricing, general 
anti-avoidance rules in Part IVA and the multinational anti-avoidance law extension of Part 
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IVA.
150
 However, while these rules address a significant number of BEPS issues, Australia’s 
current domestic tax law does not generally take account of the tax treatment of financial in-
struments, arrangements or entities in another jurisdiction, which can give rise to hybrid mis-
matches and does not, therefore, meet the OECD recommendations to address hybrid mis-
matches laid down in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2. Against this background, the BOT 
identifies a need to implement the proposed linking rules in order to tackle hybrid mismatch 
arrangements effectively.
151
 
 
In this context, the BOT also addresses the economic and compliance costs connected with 
the recommended implementation. Given the importance of the economic and compliance 
costs in implementing the proposed linking rules, the BOT recommends, in principle, imple-
menting the recommendations as set out in the Final Report on BEPS Action 2. In this con-
text, the BOT emphasises that, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise, the im-
plementation of hybrid mismatch rules in Australia should align with the recommendations of 
the OECD to ensure coordination, comprehensiveness and consistency with other jurisdic-
tions.
152
 However, at the same time, the transposition should be carried out in a manner which 
fits within Australia’s existing laws thereby minimising ongoing compliance costs and legis-
lative complexity. In order to achieve these aims, the report of the BOT proposes some minor 
modifications and exclusions to the Final Report on BEPS Action 2, without compromising 
on the key principles underlying the concept presented by the OECD.  
 
As regards the date of the commencement of the proposed linking rules, the BOT report 
acknowledges the complexity of the hybrid mismatch rules as developed by the OECD and, 
thus, supports a sufficient lead time prior to commencement of the rules to allow taxpayers to 
assess their current arrangements and, where necessary, to unwind or restructure existing ar-
rangements. According to the considerations laid down in the BOT report, taxpayers should 
also be given the opportunity to review the draft and final legislation before the hybrid mis-
match rules commence to allow for consultation and certainty in their application.
153
 In this 
context, the BOT emphasises that taxpayers should be given a minimum period of six months 
to restructure their affairs and funding arrangements with the final legislation in place. Based 
thereon, the BOT recommends that the hybrid mismatch rules should commence in Australia 
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for payments made on or after the later of 1 January 2018 or six months after the hybrid mis-
match legislation receives Royal Assent.
154
  
 
Given the proposed lead time in order to provide taxpayers with sufficient notice of the hybrid 
mismatch rules to be enacted, the BOT concludes that pre-existing arrangements should not, 
as a general rule, be grandfathered.
155
 However, at the same time, the BOT indicates that there 
may be certain categories of arrangements that are identified as appropriate for grandfathering 
thereby mentioning, for example, third party arrangements where there is a significant detri-
ment to investors arising from the application of the hybrid mismatch rules.
156
 
 
Against this background, the BOT deals with the different recommendations presented in the 
Final Report on BEPS Action 2. While the BOT recommends, in general, implementing all 
the hybrid mismatch rules into domestic law, some recommendations are considered unneces-
sary. This applies, for instance, to the Specific Recommendation 2.2 presented by the OECD 
with regard to the duplication of foreign tax credits due to hybrid transfers.
157
 According to 
the BOT, there is no integrity risk to the Australian taxation base if the said recommendation 
were not implemented.
158
 Similarly, according to the BOT, there is no significant integrity 
concern identified with regard to Recommendation 5.
159
 Therefore, and given the existing 
Australian CFC legislation, the implementation of the CFC aspects laid down in Specific 
Recommendation 5 is not encouraged. Furthermore, the BOT does not consider it appropriate 
to adopt recommendations 5.2 and 5.3 at this stage.
160
 
 
Furthermore, the BOT deals with the issue whether interest withholding tax should continue 
to apply to interest payments made to non-residents that are denied a deduction under the hy-
brid mismatch rules. In this context, while the BOT report points out that interest withholding 
tax collected on a deduction that is denied as a result of the hybrid mismatch rules will be 
considered commercially inefficient by Australian borrowers, on balance, the BOT recom-
mends that interest withholding tax should continue to apply to interest payments from hybrid 
debt financing. As the BOT acknowledges, consequently, some taxpayer groups with hybrid 
financing will be worse off than if had they used equity financing. However, given the inten-
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tion of the hybrid mismatch rules to have behavioural effects encouraging taxpayers to re-
place hybrid financing with non-hybrid financing, the BOT considers the imposition of inter-
est withholding tax on hybrid debt financing arrangements appropriate.
161
 
 
Finally, the BOT deals with the legislative design of the linking rules to be implemented de 
lege ferenda. In this context, first, the BOT considers that the hybrid mismatch rules should 
be supported by a stand-alone legislative framework and that the legislation should be drafted 
as a separate and overarching regime in Australia’s tax law.
162
 Furthermore, the BOT recom-
mends the legislation to be predominately principles-based setting out the high-level policy 
and concepts underpinning the hybrid mismatch rules. However, given the legal uncertainty 
connected with the application of such a principle-based approach, the BOT highlights the 
need of more precise drafting for particular aspects of the hybrid mismatch rules which re-
quire clear boundaries.
163
 Moreover, as it regards the application of the hybrid mismatch rules 
in relation to other parts of Australia’s tax law, the BOT concludes that, as a general rule, the 
hybrid mismatch rules should apply in priority to other parts of the tax law in order to ensure 
taxpayers are not required to technically assess whether other integrity rules apply only to 
then be denied a deduction from the application of the hybrid mismatch rules.
164
 
2.3.3 Implementation of the Linking Rules of the OECD in Europe 
2.3.3.1 Original Concept proposed by the European Commission 
Regarding the implementation of BEPS Action 2 in Europe, on the one hand, it has to be not-
ed that some countries have announced the unilateral implementation of local versions of fi-
nancial instrument hybrid mismatch rules. This is especially true for the United Kingdom. 
According to the draft hybrid mismatch legislation released on 9 December 2015, the UK is 
intending to implement the OECD hybrid mismatch recommendations thereby adapting the 
original proposal through the selective use of existing concepts and definitions laid down in 
the current UK tax legislation. In this context, the UK has announced that its hybrid mismatch 
rules will commence for payments made on or after 1 January 2017. At the same time, the 
draft UK hybrid mismatch legislation does not include any grandfathering or transitional pro-
visions.
165
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On the other hand, when dealing with the implementation of BEPS Action 2 in Europe, spe-
cial attention has to be given to the recent developments at the level of the EU. In January 
2016, the European Commission released a proposal for a directive laying down rules against 
tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the internal market (Anti-Tax 
Avoidance Directive, ATAD).
166
 As the European Commission points out, these schemes 
include situations where taxpayers act against the actual purpose of the law, taking advantage 
of disparities between national tax systems, in order to reduce their tax bill.
167
 Based thereon, 
the proposal for the ATAD set forth anti-tax avoidance rules in six specific fields, i.e. the de-
ductibility of interest, exit taxation, a switch-over clause, a general anti-abuse rule (GAAR), 
CFC rules, and, finally, a framework to tackle hybrid mismatches. 
 
With regard to the issue of hybrid mismatch arrangements, the ATAD Proposal highlighted 
that hybrid mismatches, being the consequence of differences in the legal characterisation of 
payments (financial instruments) or entities when two legal systems interact, may often lead 
to double deductions or a deduction of the income on one side of the border without its inclu-
sion on the other side. Consequently, taxpayers, especially those engaged in cross-border 
structures, would often take advantage of such disparities amongst national tax systems and 
reduce their overall tax liability in the Union. In order to counteract these hybrid mismatch 
arrangements, the European Commission proposed that the legal characterisation given to a 
hybrid instrument or entity by the member state where a payment, expense or loss, as the case 
may be, originates shall be followed by the other member state which is involved in the mis-
match. In other words, one of the two jurisdictions in a mismatch should give a legal charac-
terisation to the hybrid instrument or entity and the other jurisdiction should accept it. Conse-
quently, the proposed Article 10 reads as follows:
168
 
“Where two Member States give a different legal characterisation to the same taxpayer (hy-
brid entity), including its permanent establishments in one or more Member State, and this 
leads to either a situation where a deduction of the same payment, expenses or losses occurs 
both in the Member State in which the payment has its source, the expenses are incurred or the 
losses are suffered and in another Member State or a situation where there is a deduction of a 
payment in the Member State in which the payment has its source without a corresponding in-
clusion of the same payment in the other Member State, the legal characterisation given to the 
hybrid entity by the Member State in which the payment has its source, the expenses are in-
curred or the losses are suffered shall be followed by the other Member State. 
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Where two Member States give a different legal characterisation to the same payment (hybrid 
instrument) and this leads to a situation where there is a deduction in the Member State in 
which the payment has its source without a corresponding inclusion of the same payment in the 
other Member State, the legal characterisation given to the hybrid instrument by the Member 
State in which the payment has its source shall be followed by the other Member State.” 
 
While BEPS Action 2 is aimed at neutralising the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements,
169
 
the proposed Art 10 ATAD focused on the root causes of the hybrid mismatches, i.e. the dif-
ferent legal characterisation of the entity or payment in the concerned member states. By way 
of stipulating that the legal characterisation given to the hybrid instrument or entity in the 
source state of the payment should be followed be the other member state, the European 
Commission intended to eliminate the underlying qualification conflict.  
2.3.3.2 The Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive – Final Version 
Based on this proposal released by the European Commission, the Council adopted the ATAD 
in its meeting on 12 July 2016. However, the final version of the ATAD deviates significantly 
from the underlying proposal. This applies, inter alia, for the provision regarding hybrid 
mismatches. While the European Commission intended to tackle the qualification conflict 
itself, the concluded ATAD follows a different approach. According to the concept of the 
ATAD, in order to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements, “it is necessary to 
lay down rules whereby one of the two jurisdictions in a mismatch should deny the deduction 
of a payment leading to such an outcome.”
170
 Following these tax policy considerations, also 
the wording of the provision differs significantly when compared to the original proposal.  
 
The issue of hybrid mismatches is dealt with by Art 9 in conjunction with Art 2 para 9 provid-
ing for a specific rule in order to eliminate DD- as well as D/NI outcomes. With regard to the 
latter, Art 9 para 2 stipulates the following: 
“To the extent that a hybrid mismatch results in a deduction without inclusion, the Member 
State of the payer shall deny the deduction of such payment.” 
 
By doing so, Art 9 Abs 2 ATDA refers to the definition of hybrid mismatch arrangements laid 
down in Art 2 para 9 ATAD. Accordingly, the term hybrid mismatch means a situation be-
tween a taxpayer in one Member State and an associated enterprise in another member state 
or a structured arrangement between parties in member states where the DD- or D/NI-
outcome is attributable to differences in the legal characterisation of a financial instrument or 
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entity. Based thereon, Art 2 para 9 lit a ATAD provides for a definition of the encompassed 
D/NI-outcomes thereby covering situations where “there is a deduction of a payment in the 
Member State in which the payment has its source without a corresponding inclusion for tax 
purposes of the same payment in the other Member State ('deduction without inclusion').” As 
follows from Art 9 para 2 ATAD, in order to eliminate such a D/NI outcome, the state of 
source is required to “deny the deduction of such payment”. 
2.3.3.3 Implementation of BEPS Action 2 in the Light of the ATAD 
Against this background, member states of both the OECD and the EU, such as Austria and 
the UK, are confronted with two types of rules to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatches. 
Given the legal obligation to transpose the Directive’s provisions into domestic law,
171
 these 
countries are on the one hand obliged to follow the concept of the ATAD. On the other hand, 
according to Art 3 ATAD, the member states enjoy considerable leeway with regard to the 
implementation. In fact, since the provisions laid down in the ATAD qualify as a “Minimum 
level of protection”, the ATAD “shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-
based provisions aimed at safeguarding a higher level of protection for domestic corporate 
tax bases.” Therefore, the member states are entitled to go beyond the requirements of the 
ATAD when implementing the provisions of the Anti-BEPS-Directive into domestic law. As 
a consequence, although the recitals of the ATAD emphasise that “[i]t is essential for the 
good functioning of the internal market that, as a minimum, Member States implement their 
commitments under BEPS and more broadly, take action to discourage tax avoidance prac-
tices and ensure fair and effective taxation in the Union in a sufficiently coherent and coordi-
nated fashion”,
172
 it remains doubtful whether this goal will, in fact, be achieved. 
2.3.4 Implications of BEPS Action 2 on Singapore 
2.3.4.1 Limited Importance of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements for Tax Planning Pur-
poses as a Starting Point 
At the same time, other countries do not face such arrangements as an issue. This is due to the 
fact that, for example in Singapore, the tax outcome achieved by these structures may be as 
well achieved without using a hybrid financial instrument.
173
 Given the various tax exemp-
tions with respect to foreign sourced income laid down in Section 13 of the Singapore Income 
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Tax Act as well as the underlying concept, the taxation of inbound payments deductible at the 
level of the foreign payer at the level of the payee resident in Singapore may be easily avoid-
ed. As an example, this applies if the interest is not physically transferred to Singapore, but is 
instead received via a foreign bank account, most notably in Hong Kong. If at the same time, 
the terms and conditions and the process of the signing of the loan lack a sufficient nexus to 
Singapore, the interest received will not be subject to taxation in Singapore. Given this struc-
ture to achieve a D/NI-result, in Singapore, hybrid financial instruments and hybrid entities 
lack a sufficient advantage compared to other less complex structures. Therefore, there is no 
specific need for the use of hybrid financial instruments. At the same time, the D/NI-result is 
not considered unjustified from a Singaporean perspective. Rather, it is in line with the under-
lying concept, i.e. to exempt foreign sourced income in case of non-remittance. Consequently, 
since there is minimal tax advantage from entering into such arrangements, there appears to 
be little incentive for companies to engage in tax planning involving hybrid arrangements to 
achieve a Singapore tax advantage. 
2.3.4.2 Tax Guide of the IRAS with Regard to Hybrid Instruments 
Notwithstanding their limited importance for tax planning purposes, the issue of hybrid mis-
match arrangements has not been completely ignored by the tax administration. In fact, in the 
area of hybrid instruments, IRAS has provided some form of guidance through an e-Tax 
guide titled “Income Tax Treatment of Hybrid Instruments” published on its website on 19 
May 2014. The purpose of the guide is to provide clarity on the factors used to determine 
whether a financial instrument is considered to be debt or equity for tax purposes. Putting the 
issue of cross-border hybrid arrangements aside, as the financial market evolves and non-
conventional financial instruments being devised for commercial and regulatory reasons (e.g. 
the additional tier 1 capital required under the Basel III regulatory frameworks for capital and 
liquidity), there is a need to ascertain the tax treatment of such an advanced financial instru-
ment for domestic tax purposes.  
 
While the issuers of hybrid instruments are often concerned about the tax deductibility of dis-
tributions made on such instruments, at present, there are no specific provisions in the Singa-
pore Income Tax Act stipulating the considerations or factors for determining the nature of a 
hybrid instrument, i.e. whether it is a debt or an equity instrument. However, this very deter-
mination is crucial for the question whether the distribution is tax deductible in the hands of 
the issuer. Against this background, the tax authority has attempted to address the problem 
posed by hybrid instruments focusing on the different classification of the respective instru-
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ment. Indeed, if there is no difference in the way the instrument – and, consequently, the na-
ture of the payment arising from that instrument – is classified for tax purposes in both the 
payer and payee jurisdiction, there will be no mismatch.  
 
According to the IRAS Tax Guide, in determining the characterisation of a hybrid instrument, 
the first step is to determine its legal form, which involves an examination of the legal rights 
and obligations created by the instrument this respect. In case the legal form of a hybrid in-
strument is not indicative of or does not reflect the rights and obligations, then the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the instrument and a combination of factors will be examined. In 
this context, the factors to be considered include – but are not limited to – the following: 
a. nature of interest acquired, 
b. investor’s right to participate in issuer’s business,  
c. voting rights conferred by the instrument, 
d. the obligation to repay the principal amount, 
e. payout, 
f. investor’s right to enforce payment, 
g. classification by other regulatory authority and 
h. ranking for repayment in the event of liquidation or dissolution. 
While these factors are primarily intended for the determination of financial instruments is-
sued by a company resident in Singapore, they are also of relevance with regard to instru-
ments issued by foreign companies. In this context, it is clarified in paragraph 6.3 of the e-Tax 
guide that in the event of a mismatch between how Singapore and the (foreign) jurisdiction 
characterises the hybrid instrument, the tax authority will “evaluate the basis for the different 
characterisations, taking into consideration the specific facts of the case, before it determines 
the character of the instrument for Singapore income tax purpose”. As a consequence, given 
that this evaluation could lead to a uniform classification of the instrument in both states, the 
qualification conflict would be eliminated. By doing so, when compared to the linking rules 
of the OECD, the IRAS follows a different concept, i.e. to eliminate the root causes of the 
hybrid mismatch instead of merely neutralising the unintended effects resulting therefrom. 
However, at the same time, this approach may very well be reconciled with the underlying 
concept of BEPS Action 2. In fact, also the OECD proposes for changes to existing domestic 
provisions in order to avoid the incurrence of hybrid mismatches in the first place.
174
 As the 
OECD points out in the context of Recommendation 2.1, if the dividend exemption is denied 
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to the extent that the payment has given rise to a deduction at the level of the distributing 
company then there is no mismatch and, thus, no need to apply the Hybrid Financial Instru-
ment Rule.
175
 This logic may also be applied to the approach taken by the IRAS: In the ab-
sence of a deviating characterisation of the instrument in the payer and payee jurisdiction, 
there would be no mismatch in tax outcomes. Consequently, there would be no need to apply 
hybrid mismatch rules such as the ones proposed by the OECD under BEPS Action 2.  
2.3.4.3 BEPS Action 2 in the Light of the Current Singapore Income Tax Act 
At current, Singapore does not have any specific anti-avoidance rules targeting the mismatch-
es created by hybrid entities or instruments. Rather, on the one hand, the Singapore Income 
Tax Act provides for a general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) laid down in Section 33 of the 
Singapore Income Tax Act.
176
 However, it has rarely been applied. The case Comptroller of 
Income Tax v AQQ and another appeal [2014] SGCA 15 was the first such case, since the 
enactment of section 33 in its current form in 1988.
177
 On the other hand, as can be seen from 
various provisions, the Singapore Income Tax Act is based on implicit anti-abuse considera-
tions in order to ensure that the tax rules are not being exploited for tax planning purposes. 
For example, in terms of the deductibility of expenses, the domestic tax rules require a clear 
nexus between the generation of taxable income and the expenses that are sought to be de-
ducted against it.
178
 Furthermore, to minimise tax planning opportunities, there is no carry-
forward of foreign tax credits. In addition, the carry-forward of losses and capital allowances 
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son; (b) to relieve any person from any liability to pay tax or to make a return under this Act; or (c) to reduce or 
avoid any liability imposed or which would otherwise have been imposed on any person by this Act, the Comptrol-
ler may, without prejudice to such validity as it may have in any other respect or for any other purpose, disregard 
or vary the arrangement and make such adjustments as he considers appropriate, including the computation or 
recomputation of gains or profits, or the imposition of liability to tax, so as to counteract any tax advantage ob-
tained or obtainable by that person from or under that arrangement“ 
Para. 3: “This section shall not apply to — (a) any arrangement made or entered into before 29th January 1988; 
or (b) any arrangement carried out for bona fide commercial reasons and had not as one of its main purposes the 
avoidance or reduction of tax.“  
177
 The case concerns the restructuring of a group of companies through the incorporation of a new entity, AQQ, 
and transferring the shares of a number of subsidiary companies to AQQ. The intention of the restructuring is to 
utilise the imputation credits that the group companies have accumulated under the then-existing imputation sys-
tem for corporate tax purposes. To finance the restructuring, a fixed rate notes was obtained from a bank. 
Through a circuitous series of payment arrangements, the principal amount of the notes was repaid to the bank 
within the same day, and interest payments were generated. AQQ claimed a deduction for such interest expenses 
against the dividends paid by the subsidiary companies, and in the process, obtained a substantial amount of tax 
refund. In the absence of any cogent explanation for the complex arrangement (with round tripping of the pur-
chase price of subsidiaries and artificial interposition of external entities when the group has sufficient resources 
to finance the restructuring), the Court of Appeal ruled that the Comptroller of Income Tax was entitled to invoke 
section 33 to disregard the whole arrangement.  
178
 See, for example, with regards to interest payments Section 14 para. 1 lit a Singapore Income Tax Act (Chap-
ter 134); see also, for example, P. (Paul) Lau, Derivs. & Fin. Instrums. (Volume 17) Nr. 4 (2015) (Chapter 4.). 
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are also subject to the satisfaction of the shareholding test, and the same business test (for 
carry-forward of capital allowances). 
 
Given this legal background, it is questionable whether hybrid mismatch arrangements would 
be covered by the existing legislation. In this context, it has to be borne in mind that hybrid 
mismatch arrangements are, in general, not completely artificial but backed by commercial 
reasons. Therefore, it seems doubtful whether the GAAR could, in fact, be applied to deal 
with hybrid mismatches that arose from such arrangements. This is also acknowledged by the 
OECD stating that the terms of general anti-avoidance rules and the frequent need to show a 
direct link between the transactions and the avoidance of that particular jurisdiction’s tax tend 
to make the application of general anti-avoidance rules difficult in many cases involving hy-
brid mismatch arrangements.
179
 Thus, while GAARs can be used effectively to deal with hy-
brid mismatch arrangements that are contrived, in general, they do not provide a comprehen-
sive response to cases of unintended double non-taxation where there are, in fact, economic 
considerations underlying the hybrid mismatch arrangement.
180
 
 
Against this backdrop, specifically targeted rules may thus be necessary to deal with the issue 
of hybrid mismatches. Given the current Singapore tax system, the implementation of the 
proposed linking rules, if intended, would require legislative amendments. This can already 
be seen in the implementation of the primary linking rules. At present, a deduction is allowed 
so long as the expense is incurred in acquiring income. Therefore, the denial of a deduction at 
the level of the payer on the basis that the corresponding income has not been taxed in the 
hands of the payee would require an amendment to the current legislation. Similarly, to ensure 
the taxation of income pursuant to the defensive linking rule where the income would other-
wise not be subject to tax in Singapore would also require enacting specific legislation to that 
effect. However, as has been indicated above,
181
 if the qualification conflict with regard to the 
hybrid instrument is eliminated in accordance with the guideline presented by the IRAS, there 
is no need for the application of specifically targeted hybrid mismatch rules.  
2.3.5 Concluding Remarks 
The linking rules presented by the OECD as a result of its work on BEPS Action 2 seem to 
have significant potential to address the issue of hybrid mismatch arrangements. However, as 
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 See OECD (2012), Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (OECD Publishing), 
p. 13, para. 31. 
180
 See OECD (2012), Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (OECD Publishing), 
p. 13, para. 32. 
181
 See Section 2.3.4.2 above. 
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can be seen from the analysis above, these recommendations cope with different legal and 
economic environments around the globe. While in some countries, hybrid mismatch ar-
rangements are extensively used in order to generate mismatches in tax outcomes thereby 
resulting in governments losing corporate tax revenue, other countries do not face this issue to 
that same extent. As a consequence, also the need to implement the linking rules proposed by 
the OECD differs significantly among the jurisdictions including member states of the OECD 
and the EU as well as countries that are neither a member of the OECD nor the EU. 
 
Regarding the Asia-pacific region, special attention has to be given to Australia. Given the 
report of the Board of Taxation on the “Implementation of the OECD Hybrid Mismatch 
Rules” released in March 2016, Australia is very likely to implement to a full load of recom-
mendations under BEPS Action 2 and can be, therefore, considered the leading player in this 
respect. As it regards the implementation of BEPS Action 2 in Europe, while some countries 
have dealt with the issue of BEPS on a unilateral basis, the work at the level of the European 
Union has to be highlighted. Based on the proposal released by the European Commission in 
January 2016, the Council recently concluded the final version of the Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive thereby, inter alia, targeting the issue of hybrid mismatch arrangements. Conse-
quently, member states of the EU and the OECD, such as Austria or the UK, are confronted 
with two different approaches in order to neutralise the effects of hybrid mismatch arrange-
ments. Even though the ATAD is aimed at ensuring a consistent and coherent implementation 
of BEPS Action 2 within the EU, a closer analysis reveals some doubts with regard thereto. 
As has been shown, this is especially true because of the considerable leeway with regard to 
the implementation provided for by the ATAD. 
 
Against this background, given the existing disparities between national tax systems, the im-
plementation of BEPS-Action 2 has to be reconciled with the various legal environments 
around the globe. While the success of the concept followed by the OECD crucially depends 
on a coherent and consistent transposition and application of the proposed linking rules, a 
comparison of the approaches undertaken so far gives rise to doubts as to whether this will, in 
fact, be the case. On the one hand, this is due to the lack of legal obligation to implement the 
proposed measures. On the other hand, some countries do not face the use of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements as a significant issue and are, therefore, unlikely to see the need to implement 
the corresponding linking rules.  
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Finally, even supposing the hybrid mismatch rules were implemented consistently, there 
would remain significant possibilities for taxpayers to restructure their business relations in 
order to generate similar mismatches in tax outcomes, e.g. by the use of transactions with low 
or no tax jurisdictions or transactions with jurisdiction following a pure territorial tax regime. 
Since, in the lack of a hybrid element, these mismatches are not covered by BEPS Action 2, 
the question arises as to whether other BEPS Actions could be of relevance in this regard. 
This is especially true for BEPS Action 5, dealing with harmful tax practices. Against this 
background, the following section will analyse the potential impact of the final results of the 
work on BEPS Action 5 with respect to the existing mismatches in tax outcomes. 
3 BEPS ACTION 5: COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES 
3.1 Preferential Tax Regimes and Their Impact on the Existence of Mismatches in Tax 
Outcomes 
From a historical perspective, tax policies have been developed primarily to address domestic 
economic and social concerns. For example, countries with specific structural disadvantages, 
such as poor geographical location, lack of natural resources, etc., frequently consider special 
tax incentives or tax regimes necessary to offset non-tax disadvantages, including any addi-
tional cost from locating in such areas. This applies, inter alia, to Singapore. Given its rela-
tively small population as well as the limited natural resources, Singapore is interested in in-
bound investment. Therefore, tax incentives play an important role in the tax policy consider-
ations underlying the Singapore Income Tax Act. To a certain extent, this may also be true for 
the tax systems within one country. In this context, peripheral regions often experience diffi-
culties in promoting their development and may, at certain stages in this development, benefit 
from more attractive tax regimes or tax incentives for certain activities. Therefore, even 
though differences in tax levels and structures may have implications for other countries, 
these are essentially political decisions for sovereign tax legislators.  
 
However, while one country may view investment incentives as a policy instrument to stimu-
late new investment, other countries may view investment incentives as diverting real invest-
ment from one country to another. Establishing a preferential tax regime may erode the na-
tional tax bases of other countries thereby hampering the application of progressive tax rates 
and the achievement of redistributive goals in these foreign countries. In particular, investors 
in tax havens, imposing zero or nominal taxation, who are residents of non-haven countries 
may be able to utilise in various ways those tax haven jurisdictions to reduce their domestic 
tax liability. Therefore, the interaction of tax systems may be exploited by the enactment of 
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special tax provisions which principally erode the tax base of other countries thereby redirect-
ing capital and financial flows and the corresponding revenue from the other jurisdictions.  
 
At the same time, given the diverging tax policy considerations, unintended effects may also 
occur as a consequence of mismatches between existing tax systems, i.e. the inconsistency of 
implementing such preferential tax regimes. While these cases do not involve a country delib-
erately exploiting the interaction of tax systems to erode the tax base of another country, such 
unintentional mismatches may nevertheless be exploited by taxpayers to the detriment of ei-
ther or both countries.  
 
Consequently, and bearing in mind the different effects of the inconsistent implementation of 
preferential tax regimes illustrated above, a distinction has to be made between, on the one 
hand, harmful tax practices targeted at attracting investment or savings originating elsewhere 
or to facilitate the avoidance of other countries’ taxes, and, on the other hand, mismatches 
between national tax systems reflecting different judgements about the appropriate level of 
taxes and public outlays or the appropriate mix of taxes in a particular economy, which are 
aspects of every country’s sovereignty in fiscal matters. 
3.2 Background and Previous Work with regard to Harmful Tax Practices 
In this context, already in 1998, the OECD has published its report “Harmful Tax Competi-
tion: An Emerging Global Issue” dealing with preferential tax regimes and the underlying tax 
policy concerns as well as their delimitation to harmful tax practices.
182
 By doing so, as a first 
step, the OECD points out the potential negative effects of tax havens or harmful preferential 
tax regimes that drive the effective tax rate levied on income from the mobile activities signif-
icantly below rates in other countries. Accordingly, such tax practices have the potential to 
cause harm by, inter alia, distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows, under-
mining the integrity and fairness of tax structures, discouraging compliance by all taxpayers 
as well as causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less mobile tax bases, such as 
labour, property and consumption.
183
 While practices having all or most of these negative 
effects will be doubtlessly considered harmful, in other cases, for example where only some 
of these effects are present, the degree of harm will range along a spectrum and thus the pro-
cess of identifying harmful tax practices involves a balancing of factors. 
 
                                                
182
 See OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, OECD Publishing. 
183
 See OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, p. 16, para. 30. 
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Based on these considerations, the OECD deals with the delimitation of harmful tax practices 
and justified preferential tax regimes thereby identifying four key factors and eight other fac-
tors to be taken into account. Accordingly, the evaluation whether a preferential regime is 
potentially harmful should be based on an overall assessment of each of the following fac-
tors:
184
 
i. No or low effective tax rates 
ii. “Ring-Fencing” of Regimes 
iii. Lack of transparency 
iv. Lack of effective exchange of information 
 
In addition to these key factors, the OECD highlights the following eight other factors that 
may assist in identifying harmful preferential tax regimes:
185
 
a. An artificial definition of the tax base 
b. Failure to adhere to international transfer pricing principles 
c. Foreign source income exempt from residence country tax186 
d. Negotiable tax rate or tax base187 
e. Existence of secrecy provisions 
f. Access to a wide network of tax treaties 
g. Regimes which are promoted as tax minimisation vehicles 
h. The regime encourages purely tax-driven operations or arrangements188 
3.3 Final Report on BEPS Action 5: “Nexus Approach” 
3.3.1 The Substantial Activity Requirement in the Light of BEPS Action 5 
While the 1998 Report was followed by a whole load of other reports,
189
 the OECD deals 
with the distinction between harmful tax practices and justified preferential tax regimes in the 
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 See OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, pp. 26 et seq. 
185
 See OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, pp. 30 et seq. 
186
 According to the OECD, countries exempting all foreign-source income from tax, i.e., the regime is a territorial 
system, may be particularly attractive since the exemption reduces the effective income tax rate and encourages 
the location of activities for tax rather than business purposes (see OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue, p. 32, para. 73). 
187
 As the OECD points out, a flexibility with regard to the determination of the tax rate or the tax base allows the 
taxpayer and tax authority of the country sponsoring the regime to either negotiate a “soak-up” tax when the home 
country allows a foreign tax credit or allows the taxpayer to avoid being subject to the home country’s CFC regime 
when application of the CFC regime depends upon the host country tax rate (see OECD (1998), Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, p. 32, para. 74). 
188
 According to the OECD, many harmful preferential tax regimes are designed in a way that allows taxpayers to 
derive benefits from the regime while engaging in operations that are purely tax-driven and involve no substantial 
activities (see OECD (1998), Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, p. 34, para. 79). 
189
 See OECD (2001), Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax 
Practices, OECD Publishing; OECD (2002a), The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress 
Report, OECD Publishing; OECD (2002b), Agreement on Exchange of Information in Tax Matters, OECD Pub-
lishing; OECD (2004a), Consolidated Application Note: Guidance in Applying the 1998 Report to Preferential Tax 
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course of the BEPS project. As the OECD points out, current concerns are primarily about 
preferential regimes that risk being used for artificial profit shifting and about a lack of trans-
parency in connection with certain rulings. Against this background, already the BEPS Action 
Plan dealt with the issue of harmful tax practices. Under the heading “Counter harmful tax 
practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and substance”, BEPS Action 5, 
committed the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (FHTP) to “[r]evamp the work on harmful 
tax practices with a priority on improving transparency, including compulsory spontaneous 
exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes, and on requiring substantial activity for 
any preferential regime.”
190
 Furthermore, BEPS Action 5 indicates the importance of “a ho-
listic approach to evaluate preferential tax regimes in the BEPS context”. Finally, regarding 
non-OECD-members, BEPS Action 5 stresses the need to consider revisions or additions to 
the existing framework.
191
 Based thereon, the OECD has elaborated on the existing beneficial 
tax systems thereby focusing, especially, on their impact on BEPS outcomes.
192
 As a result of 
its work, in October 2015, the OECD published the Final Report on BEPS Action 5.
193
 
 
By requiring substantial activity for any preferential regime, BEPS Action 5 contributes to the 
second pillar of the BEPS project, i.e. to align taxation with substance by ensuring that taxa-
ble profits can no longer be artificially shifted away from the countries where the value is 
created. As also the OECD points out,
194
 this requirement is, at least to some extent, already 
contained in the 1998 report, in particular, the eight other factors looking at whether a regime 
“encourages purely tax-driven operations or arrangements”.
195
 According to the underlying 
considerations of the Final Report, bearing in mind the elevated importance of the substantial 
activity factor under BEPS Action 5, this requirement applies to all preferential regimes with-
in scope, including non-IP regimes.
196
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Regimes, OECD Publishing; OECD (2004b), Harmful Tax Practices: The 2004 Progress Report, OECD Publish-
ing; OECD (2006), The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress in Member Coun-
tries, OECD Publishing. 
190
 See OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, p. 18. 
191
 See OECD (2013), Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, p. 18. 
192
 See, for example, OECD (2014), Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account 
Transparency and Substance, Action 5: 2014 Deliverable, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, 
OECD Publishing (released on 16 Sept 2014). 
193
 OECD (2015), Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking into Account Transparency and 
Substance, Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project, (OECD Publish-
ing). 
194
 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 23, para. 24. 
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 See with regard thereto already footnote 188. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 23 et seq., para. 25. 
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3.3.2 The Substantial Activity Requirement in the Context of IP Regimes 
Given that current concerns in the area of harmful tax practices may be less about traditional 
ring-fencing and instead relate to corporate tax rate reductions on particular types of income, 
such as income from the provision of intangibles, the OECD, first, deals with the substantial 
activity requirement in the context of IP regimes. In this context, the Final Report on BEPS 
Action 5 established a “nexus approach” which looks to whether an IP regime makes its ben-
efits conditional on the extent of R&D activities of taxpayers receiving tax benefits. By doing 
so, the “nexus approach” builds on the principle that, because IP regimes are designed to en-
courage R&D activities and to foster growth and employment, a substantial activity require-
ment should ensure that taxpayers benefiting from these regimes did, in fact, engage in such 
activities and did incur actual expenditures on such activities. Accordingly, the proportion of 
expenditures directly related to development activities is considered to demonstrate real value 
added by the taxpayer and is, therefore, used as a proxy for how much substantial activity the 
taxpayer undertook.
197
 The “nexus approach” applies a proportionate analysis to income, un-
der which the proportion of income that may benefit from an IP regime is the same proportion 
as that between qualifying expenditures and overall expenditures thereby allowing a regime to 
provide for a preferential rate on IP-related income to the extent it was generated by qualify-
ing expenditures. In accordance with the underlying principle of the “nexus approach”, bene-
fits should be granted only to income that arises from IP where the actual R&D activity was 
undertaken by the taxpayer itself.
198
 For the purpose of determining what income may receive 
tax benefits, the “nexus approach” applies the following calculation:
199
 
 
			
				
		
				
× 				 = 				 
 
In case the amount of income receiving benefits under an IP regime does not exceed the 
amount determined by the “nexus approach”, the regime has met the substantial activity re-
quirement. 
3.3.3 The Substantial Activity Requirement in the Context of non-IP Regimes 
While the “nexus approach” was developed in the context of IP regimes allowing a taxpayer 
to benefit from an IP regime only to the extent that the taxpayer itself incurred qualifying re-
                                                
197
 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 24 et seq., para. 29. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 24 et seq., para. 29. 
199
 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 25, para. 30. 
Lukas Mechtler/Cindy Wong  Mismatches in Tax Outcomes 
Page | 52  
search and development expenditures that gave rise to the IP income, this principle can also 
be applied to other preferential regimes. Accordingly, such regimes would be found to require 
substantial activities where they grant benefits to a taxpayer to the extent that the taxpayer 
undertook the core income-generating activities required to produce the type of income cov-
ered by the preferential regime.
200
 The substantial activity requirement underlying the “nexus 
approach” establishes a link between income qualifying for tax benefits and the activities 
necessary to earn the income thereby focusing on the proportion of expenditures as a proxy 
for activities. In the case of non-IP regimes, the core activities at issue are, in general, geo-
graphically mobile activities such as financial and other service activities. Therefore, these 
activities may not require anything to link them to income because service activities could be 
seen as contributing directly to the income that receives benefits.
201
 Against this background, 
the crucial aspect when applying the “nexus approach” boils down to the question as to what 
constitutes the core activities necessary to earn the income. As the OECD points out, given 
that this question depends on the type of regime, even where regimes are aimed at a similar 
type of income there can be a wide variation in the application of different countries’ re-
gimes.
202
 As a consequence, a more detailed consideration of the relevant core activities 
would need to be undertaken at the time and in the context of a specific regime being consid-
ered. At the same time, however, the Final Report on BEPS Action 5 provides some guide-
lines with regard to different types preferential regimes including, inter alia, headquarter re-
gimes. 
 
In general, headquarters regimes grant preferential tax treatment to taxpayers that provide 
certain services such as managing, coordinating or controlling business activities for a group 
as a whole or for group members in a specific geographical area. As the OECD points out, 
these regimes may raise concerns if they are partly or fully insulated from the domestic mar-
kets of the country providing the regime (“ring-fencing”) or in case they provide for an artifi-
cial definition of the tax base. While these features could be addressed by the existing factors, 
these regimes could also raise concerns in respect of substance.
203
 Against this backdrop, 
when applying the “nexus approach” to such regimes the core income-generating activities of 
a headquarter company have to be determined. Taking into consideration the particular type 
of services income received by the company, these core activities could include taking rele-
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 37, para. 71. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 37, para. 72. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 37, para. 73. 
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 See OECD (2015), Action 5 – 2015 Final Report, p. 37, para. 74. 
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vant management decisions, incurring expenditures on behalf of group entities, and 
coordinating group activities.
204
 
3.4 Possible Implications of BEPS Action 5 for Singapore 
3.4.1 Status Quo: Existing Tax Incentives and Preferential Tax Regimes to Attract 
Foreign Investors 
Traditionally, Singapore has used tax policy as a tool to achieve economic growth and devel-
opment. Being a small state with limited natural resources, Singapore needs to operate a tax 
system that supports its economic and social development and provides sustainable revenue 
for the country. Besides keeping its tax rates competitive, Singapore uses tax incentives to 
promote investments in specific industries or activities, with the objective of generating eco-
nomic spinoffs and delivering long-term economic outcomes. 
 
In Singapore, tax incentives are awarded selectively to a small group of companies for a de-
fined time period. To be eligible for the tax incentive, a company must commit to conducting 
substantive economic activities in Singapore and add significant value to the economy. Such 
commitments could be in the form of creating a sizeable number of professional jobs for Sin-
gaporeans, incurring considerable business spending in Singapore, and also bringing in new 
capabilities into Singapore. Companies being awarded incentives are subject to regular checks 
of their contributions and are expected to be compliant with the Singapore tax rules. In this 
way, Singapore does not condone the artificial shifting of profits not backed by substance. 
3.4.2 Current Tax Incentives in Singapore in the Light of BEPS Action 5: Justified 
Preferential Tax Regimes or Harmful Tax Practices? 
BEPS Action 5 concerns the use of preferential tax regime for base erosion and profit shifting 
activities. BEPS Action 5 requires substantive activity for any preferential regime, and that 
taxation is aligned with substance so that profits are being taxed in the location where the 
value is created. In this respect, there should be a demonstrated link between the core activi-
ties performed and the income qualifying for the concessionary tax treatment under the pref-
erential tax regime.  
 
In this context, the OECD acknowledged that the nature of the relevant core activities would 
differ according to the specific preferential tax regime. In this regard, it has provided some 
guidance for selected types of preferential regimes. With regard to headquarters regime, 
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OECD’s view is that headquarters regime could raise concerns about ring-fencing and could 
provide an opportunity for diversion of profits through manipulating of the cost based on 
which the headquarter charges its related companies for management and coordination activi-
ties. To demonstrate substance, and a sufficient link between the income and the core activi-
ties performed, a headquarter company need to be able to show that it made relevant strategic 
management decisions and performed significant coordinating activities for the group entities, 
including incurring expenditures on behalf of the group entities in the jurisdiction where its 
income is subject to tax. To improve transparency, OECD has proposed to put in place a sys-
tem of exchange of information in respect of rulings relating to preferential tax regimes. 
 
Against this background, the question arises whether the tax incentive currently provided for 
by the Singapore Income Tax Act are in line with the substantial activity requirement. There-
fore, this section focuses on the headquarter regime laid down in Section 43E Singapore In-
come Tax Act
205
 and its compliance with the “nexus approach” established in the course of 
the work on BEPS Action 5. 
 
Singapore’s use of tax incentives is, in principle, aligned with the concept that profits should 
be taxed where substantive economic activities generating the profits are performed and 
where the value is created. Moreover, the tax rules governing the incentive awards are trans-
parent. Rules applicable to an incentive regime are clearly legislated in the Singapore Income 
Tax Act or the Economic Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act, and the rele-
vant Regulations.  
 
The headquarters regime was introduced in Singapore with an objective of attracting foreign 
companies to set up their regional headquarters in Singapore to provide administrative, man-
agement and treasury services to its subsidiaries and associated companies in the region. This, 
in turn, generates economic spinoffs and creates new business activities for Singapore. To 
enjoy the tax benefits, the approved headquarter company must have carried out substantive 
global headquarters activities in Singapore, incurred heavy business spending levels and cre-
ated employment at the technical, specialist and managerial level for local personnel. In this 
regard, the preferential tax treatment is only granted to the headquarter company if it is able to 
                                                
205
 As part of the regular review of tax incentive and to simplify the Singapore tax regime, the approved headquar-
ters incentive has been withdrawn. Instead, subject to the meeting of conditions, companies performing qualifying 
headquarter services may qualify for the existing Development Expansion Incentive – Headquarter Programme 
with effect from 1 October 2015. Notwithstanding the rationalizing, there is no change in the principle of granting 
tax incentives. 
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demonstrate the performance of its core activities in Singapore. The concessionary tax rate to 
be applied is clearly legislation under Section 43E Singapore Income Tax Act, and the list of 
qualifying services/activities can be found in the Income Tax (Concessionary Rate of Tax for 
Approved Headquarters Companies) Regulations. It includes, inter alia, business planning 
and coordination, corporate finance advisory services; credit administration and control, and 
also research and development work carried out in Singapore. In this sense, the Singapore tax 
incentive regime for headquarters is unlikely to be very much impacted by BEPS Action 5. 
3.5 Concluding Remarks – The Existing Mismatches in Tax Outcomes in the Light of 
BEPS Action 5 
Against this background, the question arises whether the modified “nexus approach” devel-
oped in the course of the work on BEPS Action 5 will have some impact on the unintended 
mismatches connected with preferential tax regimes that have been identified above.
206
 Ac-
cording to the modified “nexus approach”, preferential tax regimes are only considered 
harmful and are thus covered by BEPS Action 5, if they fail to comply with the substantial 
activity requirement. In other words, provided that there is a sufficient level of activity 
required under the preferential tax regime in order to receive the tax benefits, such a regime 
does not fall under the scope of harmful tax practices encountered by BEPS Action 5. As has 
been shown above, preferential tax regimes are often based on the tax policy consideration to 
attract foreign investors.
207
 These considerations differ between countries: While countries 
with specific structural disadvantages, such as poor geographical location, lack of natural 
resources, frequently consider special tax incentives or tax regimes crucial for their economy 
to grow, other countries do not face the need to offset such non-tax disadvantages. As a 
consequence, the inconsistency of implementing such preferential tax regimes may lead to 
mismatches in tax outcomes. However, since these preferential tax regimes, in general, re-
quire the company to engage in actual business in order to generate economic growth they are 
very likely to comply with the substantial activity requirement set forth by the “nexus ap-
proach” and are, therefore, not to be considered harmful tax practices encountered by BEPS 
Action 5. Rather, given the underlying requirement of sufficient activities for the preferential 
tax regimes to apply, such mismatches merely reflect different judgements about the 
appropriate level of taxes and public outlays or the appropriate mix of taxes in a particular 
economy, which are aspects of every country’s sovereignty in fiscal matters. As a 
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consequence, and due to the lack of fundamental harmonisation of tax legislations across 
jurisdictions, mismatches in tax outcomes will continue to exist. 
4 CONCLUSION – THE EXISTING MISMATCHES IN TAX OUTCOMES IN THE 
LIGHT OF BEPS ACTIONS 2 AND 5 
Given the different approaches with regard to income taxation and the discrepancies with re-
spect to the underlying policy considerations, the tax legislation around the globe varies sig-
nificantly. As has been shown in this paper, this is due to a number of reasons, such as the 
lack of a legal obligation and the – political – unwillingness of sovereign legislators to har-
monise the income tax systems as well as the different needs and policy considerations that 
have to be taken into account when designing the domestic tax systems. Therefore, mismatch-
es in tax outcomes are not limited to the avoidance of hybrid mismatch arrangements but are, 
in fact, a multi-faceted issue.  
 
Against this background, the purpose of the BEPS project of the OECD is, inter alia, to elim-
inate international double non-taxation caused by such mismatches while, at the same, avoid-
ing the creation of unintended double taxation. Regarding the issue of mismatches in tax out-
comes, special attention has to be given to BEPS Actions 2 and 5. As a closer analysis re-
veals, the recommendations of the OECD with respect to the domestic law under BEPS Ac-
tion 2 seem to have, in fact, significant potential to effectively address the issue of hybrid 
mismatch arrangements. However, given the lack of a legal obligation to introduce and apply 
the proposed measures in a coordinated manner, inconsistencies in how different countries 
implement the various recommendations are likely to occur. As a consequence, it remains 
doubtful whether the recommendations will achieve their underlying aim, i.e. to ensure single 
taxation of cross-border payments. This applies all the more as the recommendations of the 
OECD are dealing with the underlying qualification conflict with regard to the hybrid 
arrangements but are, on the contrary, limited to the neutralisation of the effects resulting 
therefrom. Thus, mismatches stemming from the differences in domestic rules relating to the 
classification of entities and financial instruments will continue to exist. Furthermore, there 
are a number of conceivable D/NI-outcomes that are not due to a hybrid mismatch arrange-
ment and are, therefore, outside the scope of BEPS Action 2.  
 
Mismatches in tax outcomes may also be the result of the application of preferential tax re-
gimes at the level of the recipient of the payment. Against this background, the OECD deals 
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with the distinction between harmful tax practices and justified preferential tax regimes in the 
course of BEPS Action 5 thereby specifically requiring substantial activity for any preferen-
tial regime. Based on the understanding that the substantial activity requirement used to assess 
preferential regimes should be strengthened in order to realign taxation of profits with the 
substantial activities that generate them, BEPS Action 5 proposes the so-called “nexus ap-
proach”. According to this concept, preferential regimes are found to require substantial activ-
ities where they grant benefits to a taxpayer to the extent that the taxpayer undertook the core 
income-generating activities required to produce the type of income covered by the preferen-
tial regime. However, it has to be noted that such preferential tax regimes are an important 
tool for countries to offset non-tax disadvantages in order to attract foreign business investors 
thereby increasing the number of enterprises resident in that state. This is especially true for 
countries with specific structural disadvantages, such as poor geographical location or the 
lack of natural resources. Given these underlying tax policy considerations, it remains doubt-
ful whether this approach will be comprehensively followed by sovereign tax legislators. 
 
In summary, considering the final results of the work on BEPS Actions 2 and 5, one could not 
help but notice that they are targeted at tackling the symptoms of the issues instead of dealing 
with the root causes of unintended mismatches in tax outcomes, i.e. to eliminate the existing 
disparities between national tax systems. Furthermore, due to their specific aim, BEPS 
Actions 2 and 5 provide for a limited scope. Accordingly, mismatches in tax outcomes are 
only considered unintended or harmful and are thus covered, if they are due to the use of a 
hybrid mismatch arrangement or a preferential tax regime failing to comply with the 
substantial activity requirement. As a consequence, and due to the lack of fundamental 
harmonisation of tax legislations across jurisdictions, mismatches in tax outcomes will 
continue to exist.  
 
At the same time, it has to be noted that, at present, the economies around the globe are at 
different stages of development. As it regards the use of preferential tax regimes, for 
developing economies or jurisdictions with limited geographical or personal resources, such 
tax incentives may be crucial in order to attract foreign investments. As a result, and bearing 
in mind these different tax policy considerations of sovereign tax legislators, the intended 
establishment of international coherence in corporate income taxation is unlikely to be 
achieved.  
